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The institutional design literature is interested in the optimality
of particular legal institutions, for example, judicial review of agency
actions, corporate federalism, and environmental policy. This Article
brings such an analysis to bear on federal securities regulation and
argues that we could improve upon the current institutional struc-
ture. In particular, the Article proposes that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) be given even more decision-making
authority than it currently has under the statutory scheme, effectively
authorizing the agency to create disclosure rules for any firm that op-
erates in interstate commerce. At the same time, the Article proposes
that we place greater controls on the risk of regulatory error at the
SEC by creating a statutory scheme that would place limits on the
level of regulatory costs that the agency is permitted to impose on the
firms that it regulates. By granting the expert agency more decision-
making authority, while at the same time controlling the risk of error
inherent in the SEC’s complicated regulatory task, the Article argues
that we could create an institutional structure that generates
disclosure rules that are both smarter and less error-prone. The
Article also sketches a possible policy approach along these lines.
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INTRODUCTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) created the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the modern frame-
work for regulating the securities markets.1 As is the case with
questions of institutional design more generally,2 two central goals
of the regime are allocating decision-making authority to the most
expert institution and minimizing the costs of policy error. This
Article argues that these two facets of the institutional design of
federal securities regulation need to be reconsidered.
With respect to the allocation of decision-making authority, this
Article argues that there are likely benefits to be reaped from giving
the SEC even more decision-making authority than the statute
already does.3 This claim is likely to be surprising to many, if not
most, securities law practitioners and scholars. After all, the dele-
gation that Congress made to the SEC in the Exchange Act is
expansive to say the least. Regarding what are typically referred to
as “reporting” or “public” firms, the SEC is empowered to require
all, some, or none of those firms to disclose whatever information
the SEC decides is “necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.”4 However, the grant of decision-
making authority is not absolute. This is because Congress retains
the all-important task of determining what types of firms are
subject to the SEC’s regulatory decisions. In other words, it is
Congress that determines the contours of the divide separating the
public (regulated) market from the private (unregulated) one.5
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78d (2012).
2. See infra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part II.C. 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b)(1). 
5. See, e.g., Milton Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966);
Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules
that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151 (2013); Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After
the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street
2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (2012); A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited:
Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
999 (2013).
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Yet, Congress’s line drawing in this context increasingly  seems
arbitrary in light of subsequent developments in the economic
analysis of law. When Congress created this public-private divide in
1934, it was largely concerned with placing non-disclosing or under-
disclosing firms on an equal footing with those firms that were
already disclosing information or that were disclosing a higher
quality of information prior to the creation of the mandatory re-
gime.6 Public choice theory offers reasons to question whether this
fairness concern was just political window dressing to mask an
attempt by larger firms to place their smaller rivals at a competitive
disadvantage through costly regulation.7
Furthermore, the economic case for mandatory disclosure implies
that the optimal public-private divide is probably much more
complex than the current one. The current divide is predicated on
three factors: whether a firm’s securities are listed on a national
securities exchange, whether a firm has made a public offering of
securities under the Exchange Act, or whether a firm has more than
2,000 shareholders of record.8 If a firm can answer all of these
questions in the negative, then it escapes the mandatory regime and
is part of the private, unregulated market; otherwise, the firm is
subject to the mandatory disclosure regime.9
However, the modern economic case for mandatory disclosure
implies that these disclosure triggers are probably too crude, if not
irrelevant altogether. The modern economic case posits that manda-
tory rules are necessary to correct market distortions caused by the
benefits that disclosure creates for third parties.10 The optimal
public-private divide, therefore, would target mandatory disclosure
rules at those firms or industries where the third-party effects of
information are most significant; and it would do so in reliance on
various metrics—for example, accounting profits, concentration
ratios, and measures of vertical integration—that come from the
accounting and industrial organization literature.11 The SEC’s
relative expertise makes it the best institution for making these
6. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(a)-(b), 78l(g), 78o(d) (2012).
9. See id.
10. See infra Part II.A.2.
11. See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
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types of determinations. And consequently, the SEC, and not
Congress, should be the one that determines the contours of the
public-private divide.12
Not only might we benefit from allocating this additional decision-
making authority to the SEC, but there are also benefits likely to be
gained from adopting additional measures for minimizing the risk
of policy error inherent in the SEC’s regulatory task. The Exchange
Act does not currently do much to deal with this problem, other than
subjecting SEC rules to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act.13 But while judicial review is commonly thought to
help protect against agency error and bias,14 it is at best an
imperfect tool for minimizing the risk associated with the different
sources of error that beset the SEC, which include errors resulting
from psychological biases, public choice dynamics, sophistication
deficits, and epistemic limitations.15 For these reasons, additional
error-reducing mechanisms may be necessary.
The centerpiece of the Article is a policy proposal that attempts
to operationalize these two principles of increased decision-making
authority and more robust error management. In particular, the
proposal seeks to amend the Exchange Act to eliminate the public-
private divide that Congress has created, instead leaving it to the
SEC to determine the fundamental question of whom to regulate.16
But the proposal also seeks to rein in the risk of error at the SEC by
limiting the costs that the agency can impose on firms through
12. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 (2012) (setting forth the operative provisions governing judicial
review of federal rule making).
14. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-96, 1452 (1992) (noting that judicial review can “perform a necessary
‘quality control’ function”); Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 573-74, 584, 593 (2003);
Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039
(1997); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1205-06 (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387; Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four
Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 276-78 (1986). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 616 (2002).
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part IV.A.
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disclosure rules.17 Under this aspect of the proposal, Congress would
charge an advisory committee with the task of reviewing (on a
periodic basis) the disclosure costs that the current regime imposes
on firms. This committee would then advise Congress on whether
the SEC should take some action—or refrain from taking an action
in an effort to bring disclosure costs in line with the costs of a
theoretically optimal disclosure regime. Depending on the advisory
committee’s findings, the expectation would be for Congress to
intervene at the SEC. If disclosure costs seem to be higher (or lower)
than what one might think is the theoretically optimal range, the
SEC might be required to address this issue before taking any
further regulatory (or de-regulatory) action that would add to (or
subtract from) disclosure costs. The SEC would therefore face a
strong incentive to bring its rules in line with the theoretically
optimal level of disclosure costs, as determined by the advisory
committee, because refusal would thwart the SEC’s agenda,
regardless of whether that agenda is of the regulatory or de-
regulatory variety. By expanding the SEC’s decision-making
authority while at the same time constraining error, the policy
proposal is intended to result in disclosure rules that are both
smarter and less error-prone.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief overview
of how the Exchange Act allocates decision-making authority and
seeks to control the risk of regulatory error. Part II provides a
critique of how the statute allocates decision-making authority,
arguing that the policy choices that Congress has made in crafting
the public-private divide are problematic in light of the modern
economic case for mandatory disclosure, and that the SEC is
probably better situated in any case to make the determinations
that likely are required of that economic justification of the regime.
Part III provides a critique of how the statute seeks to manage the
risk of regulatory error that inevitably accompanies the expansive
grant of decision-making authority. It argues that judicial review
alone cannot possibly address the varied types of errors that beset
an agency like the SEC. Part IV develops the policy proposal that
seeks to operationalize the principles of increased decision-making
17. See infra Part IV.B.
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authority and more robust error management developed in the
previous parts. That proposal would task the SEC, and not Con-
gress, with the determination of what firms are exempt from the
mandatory disclosure regime. At the same time, the proposal would
require Congress, through the use of an advisory committee, to limit
the SEC’s discretion to a permissible range determined by reference
to the costs that disclosure imposes on regulated firms.
I. ALLOCATING DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY AND MANAGING
ERROR IN THE EXCHANGE ACT
This Article concerns the institutional design of federal securities
regulation. The institutional design literature primarily addresses
how to allocate decision-making authority across different institu-
tions while taking into account questions of comparative institu-
tional competence and the risk of decision error.18 This Part
describes how the Exchange Act addresses two fundamental
principles of institutional design: decision allocation and error
management. At a basic level, the idea is that decision-making
authority should be allocated to minimize the sum of decision costs
18. This literature is voluminous. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES
3-13 (1994); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 74-
75 (2008); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory
Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 490-97 (2005); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith,
Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary
Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1713-16 (2002); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule,
Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1279-86 (2001); Jacob E.
Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333,
347 (Daniel A. Farber & Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010); Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and
Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 631-35 (1994);
Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 717-
22 (2008); Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J.
2512, 2514-16 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 933, 934-37 (2006); Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal
Regulatory Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 640-49 (2010);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 449, 484-90 (2008); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and
Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424 (2011) [hereinafter Stephenson,
Information Acquisition]; Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 126-43 (2005);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885,
914-19 (2003). 
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and error costs.19 The term “decision costs” refers to the costs
associated with reaching a particular decision, while the term “error
costs” refers to the costs that result if the decision-maker turns out
to be wrong.20 We typically accomplish this goal, everything else
equal,21 by allocating decision-making authority to the most
competent institution22 with respect to the question at issue.23 And
we sometimes add additional error-reducing mechanisms, like
judicial review24 or specific types of cost-benefit requirements.25
19. Todd M. Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 708, 715
(2009) (characterizing the debate over whether the federal government or the individual
states should make corporate law as one involving an assessment as to which design will
minimize the sum of decision and error costs); Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles is Dead. Now
What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937, 1942 (2009) (advocating for a proposed antitrust rule on the basis
that it minimizes the sum of decision and error costs); Arden Rowell, Allocating Pollution, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 994-95, 1000 (2012) (discussing decision and error costs in the context of
pollution policy); Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1563, 1596 (2012) (“Societies face trade-offs when designing each institution and even more
trade-offs when allocating decisions among institutions. The standard advice from theorists
is to compare decision costs along with error costs across different institutional designs and
institutional options.”).
20. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 865 (2012).
21. Of course, everything may not be equal. In particular, reducing error costs might lead
to an increase in decision costs. See, e.g., id. For a discussion of how the Article’s proposal for
reducing the error costs of disclosure regulation might affect decision costs, see infra Part
IV.B. 
22. The notion of “institutional competence” typically connotes “expertise and access to
information.” Stephenson, Information Acquisition, supra note 18, at 1424.
23. This view is associated with the legal process school of jurisprudence. See HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 168-74, 696, 1009-10, 1111 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An
Historical and Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, in HART & SACKS, supra, at li, lx-
lxi, xci-xcvi. The legal process school of jurisprudence was effectively a response to legal
realism, which itself was a criticism of legal formalism’s view that legal reasoning was
untainted by political considerations. The legal process school attempted to salvage the
legitimacy of legal institutions from the realist critique with the argument that even if society
might not be able to agree on the substantive outcomes produced by legal reasoning (because
such outcomes are influenced not solely by legal doctrine but by political predilections as
well), we might be able to agree on underlying processes for determining such outcomes. For
a list of modern works in the legal process vein, see Stephenson, Information Acquisition,
supra note 18, at 1424 n.2.
24. For a discussion and critique of judicial review’s error correction function, see Chad
M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49 (2010). 
25. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651
(2001).
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These principles are used to explain many common institutional
structures, including agency rule making,26 state-made corporate
law,27 and even the distribution of rules and standards in judicial
decision making.28 The thesis of this paper is that it is possible to
make smarter, less error-prone securities disclosure regulation by
reconsidering the institutional design of the federal securities laws.
This Part discusses how the Exchange Act allocates decision-making
authority and attempts to minimize decision error.
A. Allocating Decision-Making Authority in the Exchange Act: The
Public-Private Divide
In the United States, the federal securities laws regulate the
capital markets primarily through a mandatory disclosure regime.29
Congress authorizes the SEC to create rules requiring companies to
disclose information about themselves for the benefit of investors
and the market more generally.30 These rules are numerous and
varied, but they require issuers to disclose, among other things,
audited financial statements, a detailed description of the issuer’s
business, the compensation of top executives and the reasoning
underlying this compensation, and a discussion of trends and
developments expected to affect the issuer in the future.31 The
accuracy of these disclosures is then enforced through anti-fraud
provisions, which make issuers liable for materially misleading
misstatements or omissions.32
26. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC LAW 148-52 (1991).
27. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 19, at 715-16.
28. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
657, 668-70 (2010).
29. Other jurisdictions, including, for example, state securities regulators in the United
States, go further than this, and consider a company’s fundamentals before certifying it to sell
securities. The original draft of the federal securities laws incorporated a form of such “merit
review,” but this proposal was ultimately replaced with a purely disclosure-based regime. See
S. 875, 73d Cong. § 6(c), (e), (f) (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 13-15 (1973). 
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b)(1) (2012).
31. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K, pt. II, at 7-9, available at http://perma.cc/
7FP6-3222; see also Form 10-K for Annual and Transition Reports Pursuant to Sections 13
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2013).
32. The primary anti-fraud provision under the Exchange Act is Rule 10b-5, which
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Under the Exchange Act, Congress delegated a significant
amount of decision-making authority to the SEC to administer this
complex disclosure regime.33 In fact, the day President Roosevelt
signed the act into law, Ferdinand Pecora, who was Chief Counsel
to the Senate Banking Committee and would become one of the first
commissioners of the SEC, remarked that “[i]t will be a good or bad
law depending upon the men who administer it.”34 The reason for
the significant delegation of authority was largely political.
Lobbying by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), combined with
general opposition to the New Deal,35 resulted in a political climate
that favored agency delegation.36
But even though the SEC’s decision-making authority under the
statute is undoubtedly expansive, it is not absolute. Congress
retained for itself the determination of a central feature of the
regime—the divide that separates those companies that are eligible
for mandatory disclosure from those that are automatically exempt
from the SEC’s regulatory reach.37 After several decades, Congress
finally settled on the three disclosure triggers that are the pillars of
our current disclosure regime. In essence, the statute provides that
a company must make the required periodic disclosures called for by
the Exchange Act and adopted by the SEC if any one of the follow-
ing conditions is satisfied: first, if the company has a class of
imposes liability for misstatements of material fact, or misleading omissions of material fact,
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. See Employment of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). Under this provision, a company is liable for any
material misstatement or omission included in a report filed under the Exchange Act. See,
e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C.
L. REV. 639, 646-47 (2009). 
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l.
34. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 100 (3d ed. 2003).
35. See id. at 97 (describing the role played by the NYSE and Senator Carter Glass, the
Democratic Senator from Virginia and co-sponsor of the Glass-Steagall Act, in weakening the
Exchange Act). 
36. See, e.g., id. at 99 (“On most controversial substantive issues, Congress had been
stalemated. Rather than providing the new Commission with a clear mandate, the legislators
had granted the agency authority to study the controversy or issue its own rules. In effect,
Congress had broadly defined the Commission’s areas of expertise and invited it to forge its
own mandate.”).
37. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1354; Guttentag, supra note 5, at 152-53; Langevoort &
Thompson, supra note 5, at 343; Pollman, supra note 5, at 187-89; Pritchard, supra note 5, at
1000-01.
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securities listed on a national securities exchange;38 second, if the
company has assets in excess of $10 million and a class of equity
securities held by at least 2,000 record holders;39 and third, if the
company has filed a registration statement under the Securities Act
of 1933 that has become effective.40
Thus, Congress made a decision to focus the disclosure regime on
firms that make public offerings, that are listed on exchanges, or
that have a significant shareholder base.41 Together, these disclo-
sure triggers prevent the SEC from creating disclosure rules for
non-exchange-listed firms that have made no registered offering of
securities and that have fewer than 2,000 shareholders of record.42
With respect to all other firms, the SEC has substantial decision-
making authority. Congress effectively determines the domain of
disclosure—what types of information must be included in an
Exchange Act report43—and then leaves it up to the SEC to create
the corresponding rules.44
Although it does not appear that this public-private divide was
the result of a particularly sophisticated theory of line-drawing, and
what reasons that were offered for these three disclosure triggers
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (requiring registration of securities listed on a stock exchange
by prohibiting brokers and dealers from transacting in any exchange-listed security that is
unregistered).
39. See id. § 78l(g). The JOBS Act increased the statutory threshold from 500 to 2,000
shareholders. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 501,
§ 12(g)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(A)). 
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
41. With respect to this last trigger, the principal constraint is the shareholder threshold,
since even many small businesses satisfy the $10 million asset requirement. Also, it is
important to emphasize that the shareholder threshold is a standard based on record
ownership, not beneficial ownership. Because even large firms may have relatively few record
shareholders, this standard is much more difficult to satisfy than it might first appear. 
42. See id. § 78l(g)(1)(A). However, under the rule, there can be no more than 499
shareholders that do not qualify as “accredited investors” without triggering the disclosure
requirements. Id. The rule excludes from these calculations people who obtained equity under
the company's equity compensation plans and investors who purchased securities pursuant
to the crowdfunding exemption. See id. § 78l(g)(2).
43. See id. § 78l(b) (setting forth a description of the information to be contained in a
report filed with the exchange).
44. Although the SEC does not have the authority to exempt firms that are swept into the
regime by virtue of sections 12(b) or 15(g) of the Exchange Act—the disclosure triggers
pertaining to securities listed on a national securities exchange or for public offerings—the
SEC does have such exemptive authority with respect to section 12(g), the disclosure trigger
pertaining to the number of record shareholders in the firm. See id. § 78l(h).
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are considered in more detail below,45 the three-stage evolution of
the divide is well documented.
The public-private divide was created, in its initial form, in 1934
with the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act, which for the first
time imposed disclosure obligations on companies on a continuing
basis.46 Because the Exchange Act’s focus was on improving the
transparency of national securities exchanges,47 it is perhaps not
surprising that the companies Congress originally targeted for
disclosure in the Exchange Act were those listed on a national
securities exchange.48 Two years later, in the Exchange Act Amend-
ments of 1936 (1936 Amendments),49 Congress extended the
mandatory disclosure regime created in the Exchange Act to
companies that make a registered offering under the Securities Act,
thereby making Securities Act registration a second determinant of
the public-private divide.50 In many quarters, the 1936 Amend-
ments were viewed as simply the completion of what had been
started in 1933, because even then many expected there to be
ongoing disclosure obligations of firms that made a public offering
under the Securities Act.51 The 1936 Amendments were justified in
part on the basis that “most of the benefits from requiring disclosure
by firms at the time of offering their securities publicly would
continue once the securities of the firm were publicly traded.”52 Of
course, this is not entirely obvious considering that 1933 Act
reporting seems to be particularly concerned with the aggressive
45. See infra Part II.A-B.
46. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 1340-41.
47. The ultimate law that was adopted was a watered down version of a bill that would
have radically altered the practices of exchanges. For example, the earlier version would have
set fixed margin requirements. It would have also completely revolutionized stock exchange
membership by eliminating floor traders, prohibiting specialists from trading for their own
accounts, and barring brokerage firms from acting as dealers or underwriters. See SELIGMAN,
supra note 34, at 86. The battle over the Exchange Act was largely fought on these fronts
rather than on the issue of disclosure. 
48. See supra note 38.
49. Act of May 27, 1936, ch. 462, 49 Stat. 1375 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
50. 15 U.S.C. 78o(d) (2012).
51. See SELIGMAN, supra note 34, at 142-43 (explaining how the Securities Act left it to
the SEC to study the issue of the regulation of the over-the-counter markets and to propose
legislation in light of the study). 
52. Guttentag, supra note 5, at 165. 
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sales tactics involved in primary offerings,53 tactics that are absent
in the case of secondary trading. So, it is questionable how justifi-
able this reason was, but regardless, it was one of the reasons given
for the change.
It was not until 1964 that the third determinant of the public-
private divide, the shareholder threshold of section 12(g), was added
to the Exchange Act.54 This change was in large part spearheaded
by President Kennedy’s new SEC Chairman, William Cary, who had
made it his goal to complete the unfinished business of the New
Deal, including filling in perceived gaps in the securities disclosure
regime.55 To this end, Cary commissioned a study (Cary Study) by
a group of prominent practitioners and academics on how to improve
securities regulation in the United States.56 That study observed
that the current regime overlooked a whole class of firms in the
over-the-counter market that, although seemingly indistinguishable
from their counterparts on the national securities exchanges,
escaped disclosure obligations simply because they were not listed
on those exchanges.57 The study concluded that a shareholder
threshold test was the best means of identifying which of these
firms should be subject to disclosure obligations.58
The structure of the public-private divide has remained the same
since the 1964 amendments, although there have been a few chang-
es on the margins. The most important of these took place through
the legislative vehicle of the JOBS Act of 2012, in which Congress
increased the shareholder threshold of section 12(g) from 500 to
2,000 shareholders of record.59 Although the legislative history is
not particularly illuminating as to the reasoning underlying this
53. See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1585-86 (2013).
54. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 566-67
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012)).
55. SELIGMAN, supra note 34, at 293.
56. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, at 1-2 (1963).
57. See id. at 1.
58. See id. at 56.
59. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
422 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:409
change,60 the statute as a whole was justified as an attempt to
improve economic growth by fostering the growth of small busi-
nesses.61 By increasing the disclosure trigger under section 12(g),
the JOBS Act would arguably serve that goal by allowing smaller
firms more time to gestate before having to submit to costly
disclosure under the Exchange Act.62
B. Managing Regulatory Error in the Exchange Act: Reliance on
Judicial Review
Given the expansive decision-making authority that the Exchange
Act affords the SEC, one might assume that the statute also
provides important mechanisms for controlling the risk of regula-
tory error. However, the Exchange Act does not explicitly address
the risk of regulatory error, nor does the statute’s legislative history
reflect a concern for this issue.63 Indeed, the Exchange Act was a
piece of New Deal legislation, and the need for administrative
60. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, pt. 2 (2012).
61. See Editorial, Start ‘em Up: The Legitimate Goals—and Overblown Claims—of the
JOBS Act, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2012, at A14 (explaining the reasoning behind the JOBS Act
as creating an "engine of growth"); Edward Wyatt, Senate Seeks to Toughen a Bill Aimed at
Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at B2 (characterizing the House bill as attracting
“widespread support on Capitol Hill and from the White House for its promise of attracting
small-business investment and allowing businesses to hire workers”); Barack Obama,
President of the United States, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5,
2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/04/05/president-obama-signs-
jobs-act#transcript [http://perma.cc/QN9H-KFEZ] (President Obama said upon signing the
bill that it would make it easier for companies to go public, which is a “major step towards
expanding and hiring more workers”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, JOBS Act Jeopardizes Safety Net
for Investors, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/
jobs-act-jeopardizes-safety-net-for-investors/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
[http://perma.cc/QY9F-XL74] (characterizing the statute as being “aimed at making it easier
for small-businesses to find investors early and to continue to grow in the public markets by
lowering some of the bureaucratic barriers”).
62. The House Committee on Financial Services recommended amending section 12(g) of
the Exchange Act in this way in order to allow companies to accomplish their financing needs
without risking becoming subject to the increased regulatory costs of being a public company.
See H.R. REP. NO. 112-327, at 2 (2011).
63. As discussed in greater depth below, the statute does not contain the type of cost-
benefit requirements typically included in legislation that is concerned with reigning in
regulatory error. See infra Part III. For a taxonomy of these cost-benefit mechanisms, see
generally Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 151 (2001).
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discipline was a distinctly post-New Deal concern.64 Accordingly, it
should not be too surprising that the way the Exchange Act ended
up dealing with the risk of regulatory error at the SEC was not
through any statutory mechanism, but rather through reliance on
judicial review of agency rules.
Judicial review has long been viewed as a potential tool for
correcting agency errors and bias.65 The enactment of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act itself was in part motivated by this goal.66 And
the development of the doctrine of hard look review,67 which
increased the level of scrutiny to be applied to agency rules, was
based on similar concerns.68 However, as explained in Part III,
courts cannot be expected to control for all of the types of error
inherent in the regulatory task faced by the SEC.69
Thus, the Exchange Act makes a significant, although not
absolute, delegation of authority to the SEC while leaving courts to
manage the regulatory error risk associated with this expansive
delegation. The following two Parts argue that we could benefit from
even more delegation to the SEC combined with more of an effort to
manage the risk of error associated with such delegation.
64. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 809 (2008) (identifying the post-New Deal period as one characterized
by attempts to place controls on agencies whose decisions were viewed as “distinctly sus-
ceptible to the influences of self-interested private groups, or otherwise a product of bias and
confusion”).
65. See McGarity, supra note 14, at 1452 (noting that judicial review can “perform a
necessary ‘quality control’ function”); Mendelson, supra note 14, at 656; Merrill, supra note
14, at 1039; Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 1206; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 14, at 430;
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 289. But see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 14 at 627 (doubting
the efficacy of judicial review).
66. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 64, at 810.
67. Hard look review refers to the standard that courts apply in reviewing agency rule
making. In other words, to survive hard look review, the agency “must articulate a
‘satisfactory’ explanation for its actions that does not ‘run counter to the evidence before the
agency’ and that demonstrates a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’ ” Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 545
(1985) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983)). 
68. See id. 
69. See infra Part III.
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II. CRITIQUING THE STATUTE: ALLOCATING DECISION-MAKING
AUTHORITY
Congress’s delegation to the SEC to craft disclosure rules seems
relatively unobjectionable from an institutional design perspective.
The SEC is clearly the more expert institution to deal with such
regulatory minutiae.70 However, Congress’s determination to retain
decision-making authority with respect to the public-private divide
is slightly more difficult to evaluate, if only because it requires a
proper understanding of the underlying goal of disclosure regula-
tion. This Part makes three observations. First, the few original
justifications advanced for the public-private divide that Congress
created with this authority are highly questionable in light of
subsequent developments in public choice theory and the economic
analysis of the law. Second, more recent revisionist attempts to
justify Congress’s line-drawing in light of the dominant case for
disclosure regulation similarly fall short. And third, the dominant
case for disclosure regulation, which is based on the third-party
effects of information, suggests that the optimal public-private
divide is probably much more complex than our current definition
and draws on highly specialized inquiries into accounting and
industrial organization. The implication is that we could probably
benefit from having the SEC, and not Congress, decide this crucial
issue.
A. Critiquing the Original Justifications for the Public-Private
Divide
Congress did not base the public-private divide in federal
securities law on a particularly sophisticated theory of the optimal
approach to line-drawing in this context. However, there are at least
two principles that seem to have motivated the lines that Congress
ultimately decided to draw.
The first principle is a concern with fairness, and in particular the
need to draw the public-private divide so as to level the playing field
70. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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between firms that were already disclosing information and those
that were not.71 This was certainly the case with the original
adoption of the Exchange Act in 1934. Since at least the late 1800s,
some but not all, firms on the NYSE had been disclosing informa-
tion to their investors and agitating for the exchange to impose
mandatory rules requiring all of its members to fall in line.72 In
response, the NYSE adopted a mandatory disclosure regime that
seemed to achieve fairly substantial, although apparently not
complete, compliance by the time the Exchange Act was enacted in
1934.73 However, firms could still avoid the NYSE’s mandatory
disclosure rules by simply choosing to trade on the New York Curb
Exchange, the precursor to the American Stock Exchange,74 which
did not impose any disclosure requirements on its participants.75
The Exchange Act’s mandatory disclosure regime effectively
placed all exchange-listed firms on the same footing, meaning that
it solved whatever latent compliance problems existed at the NYSE
while at the same time addressing the regulatory arbitrage problem
created by the existence of exchanges like the New York Curb Ex-
change.76 Once that cohort of exchange-listed firms was required to
make certain disclosures, any extension of the disclosure regime
was then predicated on the basis that firms similar to the already
disclosing firms should also be subject to the regime in order to “lev-
el the playing field.”77 This argument was used to justify the 1936
Amendments, which extended the disclosure rules to companies
that had made public offerings,78 as well as the amendments in 1963
71. Michael Guttentag was the first to identify this underlying principle. See Guttentag,
supra note 5, at 168.
72. See id. at 160 (citing John C. Hilke, Early Mandatory Disclosure Regulation, 6 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 229, 231 (1986)).
73. Professor Seligman has identified a number of roadblocks that prevented complete
compliance with the NYSE’s disclosure rules. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 54-55 (1983). But others have
suggested that regardless, by the 1910s, most firms were complying with the NYSE’s
disclosure requirements. See John C. Hilke, Early Mandatory Disclosure Regulations, 6 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 229, 231 (1986).
74. See SELIGMAN, supra note 34, at 47.
75. See id.
76. For a discussion of regulatory arbitrage more generally, see Victor Fleischer,
Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).
77. See S. REP. NO. 74-1739, at 3 (1936).
78. Guttentag, supra note 5, at 165-66 (indicating that one goal of the amendment was
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to include large companies as measured by the size of the share-
holder base.79 The problem with this argument, however, is that it
only makes sense to level the playing field if we think that the
players are similarly situated and that the original rules were based
on sound reasoning. The public choice version of this story calls both
of these factors into question, as discussed below.80
The second principle that seems to have influenced the develop-
ment of the public-private divide was the view that the divide was
simply another application of the philosophy that disclosure was
necessary for investor protection. For example, the Cary Study was
motivated primarily by investor protection concerns. In justifying
their use of a criterion based on the number of shareholders instead
of alternative criteria, the study concluded that alternative criteria
were not as tailored to the investors’ interests that needed protec-
tion.81 Further, the Congresses that adopted the Cary Study and the
1963 Amendments clearly understood the Exchange Act as being
about investor protection generally.82 And the Exchange Act itself
evidences the statute’s preoccupation with investor protection.83
Both of these principles—the expansion of the disclosure regime
in order to level the playing field and mandatory rules as a necessity
for the protection of investors—became questionable with subse-
quent developments in the economic analysis of law.
1. Critiquing the Leveling the Playing Field Justification
As mentioned previously, the original Exchange Act provision
imposing a mandatory disclosure regime on all exchange-listed
firms was supported by the New York Stock Exchange, which had
been trying (with substantial but not total success) for decades to
“an endeavor to create a fair field of competition among exchanges and between exchanges
as a group and the over-the-counter markets” (citing S. REP. NO. 74-1739, at 3 (1936)).
79. Id. at 166-67.
80. See infra Part II.A.1.
81. Guttentag, supra note 5, at 167 n.86.
82. See id. at 165-68 (“There is no convincing reason why the comprehensive scheme of
disclosure that affords effective protection of investors in the exchange market should not also
apply in the over-the-counter market” (citing S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 9 (1964))).
83. Michael Guttentag has pointed out that the terms “ ‘protection of investors’ or ‘investor
protection’ appear over 200 times” in the Exchange Act. See Michael D. Guttentag, Protection
From What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 212 (2013).
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impose mandatory disclosure rules on all of its member firms.84 One
commentator has noted that the NYSE’s frustrated effort was
“likely the result of pressure from firms already providing high-
quality disclosures.”85 In evaluating this attempt to level the playing
field, the crucial question to ask is why did some of the NYSE-listed
firms decide to disclose while others did not? Or why did some firms
choose to list on the NYSE and submit to mandatory disclosure
while others preferred to trade on the New York Curb Exchange and
thereby avoid such rules? There are two potential answers to that
question: a supporting one that favors Congress’s attempt to level
the playing field, and a critical one—provided by public choice
theory—that substantially undermines it.
The supporting narrative is that the firms that were already
providing high-quality disclosure on a more or less voluntary basis86
were doing so because they were high-quality firms with nothing to
lose and a lot to gain—at least from investors—by disclosing
information. Under this view, it would be reasonable for these high-
quality firms to support mandatory disclosure rules in order to avoid
a market for “lemons”.87 This occurs when investors are unable to
distinguish between high- and low-quality firms and therefore treat
all firms as if they are of average quality, which has the effect of
penalizing the high-quality firms.88 At the extreme, if high-quality
firms are unable to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the
consumer, the unwarranted discount they receive from such
undiscriminating buyers may force them to exit the market
entirely.89 Thus, under this supporting narrative, leveling the
84. Seligman, supra note 73, at 56-57.
85. Guttentag, supra note 5, at 160.
86. I say “more or less” because it is not clear how many of these exchange-listed firms
were disclosing on a purely voluntary basis prior to the NYSE’s efforts to implement
mandatory disclosure rules. However, considering that the NYSE’s subsequent efforts seemed
to allow many listed firms to refuse compliance with little or no penalty, I think it is
reasonable to view the disclosure choice as a largely voluntary one, even if the NYSE
technically had disclosure rules in place. Additionally, since other venues existed for trading
securities, like the New York Curb Exchange, that did not require disclosure, the decision to
list with the NYSE was effectively a voluntary decision to disclose.
87. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanisms, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 488, 499-500 (discussing how consumers may retaliate when displeased with
the quality of purchased goods if other comparable goods are available).
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playing field by requiring all exchange-listed companies to submit
to the same disclosure rules might make sense, because it avoids the
market for lemons and provides investors with the ability to make
distinctions between high- and low-quality firms.90
Even though the lemons problem justification is plausible, there
is an alternative view of this attempt to level the playing field that
is comparatively less favorable to that undertaking. This critical
account emerges from public choice theory, which attempts to
explain political outcomes by analyzing the incentives of legislators
and interest groups.91 Under the cost predation model of public
choice theory, larger, more established firms in an industry lobby for
additional laws, the costs of which will be borne by all industry
participants but will weigh disproportionately on the lobbying
group’s smaller, less established competitors.92 This cost predation
version of public choice theory offers a different, less supportive
view of Congress’s attempt to “level the playing field” through
mandatory disclosure. Under this view, the firms that were already
making voluntary disclosures desired a mandatory disclosure
regime not in an attempt to avoid a potential market for lemons;
rather, these firms lobbied for mandatory disclosure in an attempt
to increase the costs of their comparatively smaller competitors who
90. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418-19 (2003); Edward Rock,
Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory
Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 676 (2002).
91. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989) (“Public choice can be defined as
the economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to
political science. The subject matter of public choice is the same as that of political science:
the theory of the state, voting rules, voting behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so
on. The methodology of public choice is that of economics, however.”); see also FRED S.
MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL
EXTORTION 14 (1997); Peter H. Aranson, Theories of Economics Regulation: From Clarity to
Confusion, 6 J.L. & POL. 247, 249-50 (1990); Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 629, 632 (2008); Michael E. Levine, Why Weren’t the Airlines Reregulated?, 23 YALE J.
ON REG. 269, 272 (2006); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture,
Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169-70
(1990); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 101-02 (1987); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Econ-
omic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 335-36 (1974); George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). 
92. See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 91, at 14-15.
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had decided that it was not cost-effective to make the same disclo-
sures as their larger, more established rivals.
If this type of cost predation story is what underlies the account,
then we should be very concerned that the original decision to
mandate disclosure of all exchange-listed firms was not justifiable.
And if that decision was not justifiable, then the attempts to “level
the playing field” by extending the regime to all similarly situated
firms, including those in the over-the-counter market, also lacked
justification. In other words, there is good reason to question the
first of the two principles upon which Congress seemed to base its
creation of the public-private divide.
2. Critiquing the Investor Protection Justification for the Public-
Private Divide
There are also reasons to question the second principle that
motivated Congress’s view of the public-private divide, that the
divide reflects the goal of investor protection. The modern case for
mandatory disclosure maintains that disclosure rules should not be
designed solely with investors in mind, and advances a view of how
investors benefit from disclosure that is radically different from the
one that would have influenced Congress’s creation of the public-
private divide during the New Deal.
This modern case for mandatory disclosure began to emerge in
the 1960s, when a group of economic-minded legal academics began
questioning the normative desirability of mandatory disclosure in
general by pointing out that if disclosure was so valuable to invest-
ors, then investors should be willing to pay for it, and in return
issuers should be willing to provide it.93 And as evidence of such a
market for disclosure, these same commentators pointed to a long
history of disclosure practice that predated the federal securities
93. George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 132 (1973); George J. Benston, The
Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC’s Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969);
George J. Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCT. REV.
515, 515-16 (1969); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS.
117, 117, 133 (1964). See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966); HENRY G. MANNE & EZRA SOLOMON, WALL STREET IN TRANSITION (1974).
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laws, including the history of voluntary disclosure among NYSE-
listed firms.94 The weight of opinion95 ultimately converged on the
notion that mandatory disclosure is necessary to protect investors,96
but only in order to correct distortions that arise as a result of the
benefits that non-investors97 receive from disclosure.98 In particular,
94. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 289 (1991) (“Firms have been disclosing important facts about
themselves—and certifying these facts through third parties—as long as there have been
firms.”). 
95. In truth, there are other justifications for mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., Michael D.
Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA.
ST. L. REV. 123, 178-91 (2002). I focus here on the interfirm externalities justification because
of its prominence in the literature. However, my ultimate argument—that the SEC, and not
Congress, should decide the domain of securities regulation—only requires that the interfirm
externalities justification be a reason (but not necessarily the sole reason) for mandatory
disclosure, and that this justification should play a role in determining the domain of
securities regulation.
96. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1999) (acknowledging that by the mid-
1980s a “rough consensus” had been reached regarding the need for mandatory disclosure)
[hereinafter Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure]; Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate,
2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563, 563-64 (2001) [hereinafter Fox, The Issuer Choice];
Guttentag, supra note 95, at 125-26. However in the late 1990s, a new group of mandatory
disclosure critics emerged who argued in favor of allowing issuers to choose which inter-
national disclosure regime would apply to their securities. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew
T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (1998); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous
Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 228-32 (1996);
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 2359, 2361-62 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors]; Roberta
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 387, 388 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, The Need for Competition].
97. Firms may fail to capture one particular benefit of disclosure even when it primarily
benefits its own investors, and that is with respect to disclosure’s reduction of agency costs.
In order to capture the agency cost-reducing benefits of disclosure, the firm might need to
make an ex ante commitment to investors that it will make periodic disclosure in the future,
and it may be unable to make that type of commitment. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory
Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1363-65, 1367-68.
98. On occasion, it is argued that mandatory disclosure is necessary to overcome the
collective action problem faced by disparate shareholders in a corporation. Collective action
problems arise when an efficient result fails to materialize because of a group’s failure to
organize in order to take the necessary actions to bring about the desired result. Although
individuals as a group value the result enough to justify its realization, no single individual’s
valuation is sufficient to justify its existence. Therefore, no single individual has an incentive
to realize the result. And because of the costs of organization, the group fails to act collect-
ively, resulting in inaction.
In the corporate context, a collective action problem typically arises when shareholders
desire some outcome that management has no incentive to help bring about, for example, the
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the literature focuses on “interfirm externalities,” or externalities
that occur when a firm’s disclosure confers a competitive advantage
upon its competitors, suppliers, or customers.99 For example,
disclosure of a firm’s material contracts might provide a firm’s
supplier with insights that will help the supplier gain the upper
hand in future negotiations.100 Or disclosure of the profitability of
particular business segments might induce competitors to enter the
market and therefore pose a competitive threat to the firm.101 The
disclosing firm fails to take into account these third-party bene-
fits—and in fact views them as private costs of disclosure—and
election of a non-management nominated director or the adoption of a management-hostile
governance feature. Although shareholders as a group might value the result enough to justify
it, no single individual shareholder’s valuation of that result is sufficient to justify its
existence. Consequently, collective action issues prevent the result from taking place.
But the collective action problem, as it might now be apparent from these examples, cannot
possibly be a justification for mandatory disclosure. This is because unlike in the case of
shareholder voting, management has incentives in the disclosure context to provide the result
demanded by investors because managers can increase firm profits by doing so. In other
words, in the disclosure context, management itself solves that collective action problem faced
by investors because it has incentives to provide disclosure in exchange for lower capital costs.
In this sense, collective action is no more a barrier to issuers providing investors with desired
disclosure than collective action is a barrier to companies providing consumers with desired
products. To be sure, it might cost the issuer to determine what exactly the investors want
in the way of disclosure, just as it might cost a company to figure out what their consumers
want in their products. And it is true that mandatory disclosure would effectively subsidize
those verification costs; but creating a federal mandatory disclosure regime is a high price to
pay simply to subsidize management’s costs in verifying the level of disclosure that its
investors demand.
Thus, the agency cost issue and collective action concerns are not particularly persuasive
justifications for mandatory disclosure.
99. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1345-46; see also
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 94, at 291 (theorizing that issuers will take into account
the costs that disclosure imposes on their competitive position); Guttentag, supra note 95, at
130, 136. Some commentators have suggested that if shareholders are diversified, disclosing
firms will not take into account these pecuniary externalities because shareholders of the
disclosing firm will also be shareholders of the third-parties that are on the receiving end of
these third-party benefits. See, e.g., Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 96, at 2368.
Thus, these common shareholders will pay more for the disclosing firm’s disclosures, thereby
creating the necessary incentives to produce those disclosures. But it is not at all clear how
many of these common shareholders there will be in light of the relatively few investments
that one must hold in a portfolio in order to reap the benefits of diversification. See Fox,
Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1352. Also, many of these third party firms
will be closely-held private companies, making it less likely that there will be common
shareholders. 
100. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1345.
101. See id.
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consequently produces less disclosure than it would in the absence
of these costs.102 Both the theoretical and empirical literature sug-
gest that such interfirm externalities are potentially significant.103
The literature also recognizes other third-party beneficiaries of
voluntary disclosure, including analysts104 and society at large.105
Regardless of the nature of the third-party effect in question,
however, the argument is the same: Under a voluntary disclosure
regime, the disclosing firm fails to take into account the benefit of
disclosure to these third-parties, resulting in a sub-optimal level of
disclosure and harm to investors.106 Even though ultimately this
102. See id. at 1345-46.
103. See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 95, at 147-49, 158-59, 162-63.
104. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 94, at 290 (“The information produced by one
firm for its investors may be valuable to investors of other firms .... Because they cannot be
charged, the information will be underproduced.”); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 757-58 (2006); see also
Guttentag, supra note 95, at 136 (identifying third-party beneficiaries of disclosure as
including “investors, some of whom may use disclosed information despite not owning shares
in the disclosing firm”).
105. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1358 (“A second social
benefit of disclosure is an improved choice among proposed new investment projects in the
economy.”); Guttentag, supra note 95, at 136 (identifying third-party beneficiaries of
disclosure as including “the economy as a whole, which could benefit from an improved
allocation of assets”); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 378 (“As public law scholars
have been pointing out for some time, there are certain norms of social legitimacy increasingly
placed not only on government actors, but on private institutions that exercise substantial
power and have the capacity to inflict considerable harm on society. These norms include a
reasonable degree of transparency, some level of accountability, and an openness to external
voices. We believe that any rule of securities regulation that promotes any of these norms is
likely to be motivated, at least in part, by that inchoate sense of the public responsibility of
‘private’ institutions.”); cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Robert Jackson, Shining Light on
Corporate Political Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013) (arguing in favor of rules for corporate
political speech).
106. The third-party effects justification for mandatory disclosure assumes that the infor-
mation externalities in question are positive and therefore that the market generates too little
disclosure. Professor Romano has challenged this claim, arguing that in reality the opposite
could be true. See, e.g., Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 96, at 387, 464-93.
However, as Merritt Fox has pointed out, it is difficult to think of an example where a firm’s
disclosure would have a negative effect on the cash flows of third-party firms. See, e.g., Fox,
Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1350 n.25. One example involves
information about a new patent for a valuable new technology that, when disclosed, causes
the stock price of the disclosing firm’s competitors to fall. Fox, The Issuer Choice, supra note
96, at 570-73; see Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 96, at 387, 432, 464-93. But
as Professor Fox has explained, in that example, the disclosure itself does not actually cause
the decline in the price of the competition’s stock. That was inevitable upon the obtaining of
the patent. Rather, the disclosure simply informed the market of this fact sooner than would
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theory concludes that investors might benefit from mandatory
disclosure,107 this is a very different theory of how this happens than
the one that would have motivated the New Deal concept of the
public-private divide.108 Thus, while it makes sense to base the
public-private determination on an investor protection principle, the
modern view of how mandatory disclosure goes about protecting
investors is likely to yield a very different result than the one that
Congress seized upon in the Exchange Act.
Thus, the modern case for mandatory disclosure is based on the
view that mandatory disclosure is necessary to correct market
distortions by focusing on the third parties that benefit from
disclosure. Under this view, mandatory disclosure rules only benefit
investors to the extent that the rules target market distortions that
arise from the third-party effects of information. Nor should
mandatory disclosure rules be designed solely with the investor in
mind, since third parties benefit from these rules as well. This view
of mandatory disclosure and its relationship to investors is radically
different from the one that would have influenced Congress’s
creation of the public-private divide over the thirty-year period
beginning in 1933.109 For this reason, that divide may be in need of
re-thinking. However, one might nevertheless try to justify the
public-private divide that Congress gave us based on this modern
case for mandatory disclosure. The next Section considers such
revisionist justifications and concludes that none of the determi-
nants of the public-private divide that Congress has given us follow
inexorably from the modern economic case for mandatory disclosure.
have otherwise occurred. See Fox, The Issuer Choice, supra note 96, at 573-74. One possibility
is where a firm has information that it has obtained about one or more of its competitors that
once disclosed would harm its competitors more than it would harm itself. But such disclosure
would have to be able to be made without incurring substantial civil or criminal penalties, or
the firm would not voluntarily disclose it. It is exceedingly difficult to come up with a
plausible scenario along those lines. For these reasons, I tend to agree with Professor Fox.
107. See Guttentag, supra note 95, at 159 (setting forth a simple numerical example
illustrating how investors lose when the third-party effects of information cause a firm to
voluntarily disclose less information than is optimal).
108. This point is implicit in the economic critique of mandatory disclosure that emerged
in the 1960s, which took as a given that the dominant pro-disclosure paradigm assumed that
disclosure would not take place in the absence of mandatory rules. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
109. See supra Part I.A.
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B. Critiquing the Revisionist Justifications for the Public-Private
Divide
Is it possible to defend the Exchange Act’s public-private divide
in light of the modern case for mandatory disclosure? The first
challenge lies in having to explain why any firm should be excluded
from a mandatory disclosure regime under a view rooted in the
third-party effects of information, since all firms must experience
such effects to a certain degree. All firms have some current or
potential competitor, or possibly a supplier, who might benefit from
disclosure and therefore cause the firm to make sub-optimal dis-
closures. And most firms have at least the potential of an analyst
following if only the firm would internalize those benefits and make
more disclosures.110 However, in light of regulatory resource
constraints, it may nevertheless make sense to exclude some group
of firms from the regime to focus disclosure efforts on those firms for
which the market failure arising from the third-party effects of
information is thought to be particularly acute.
And in fact, one can discern in the literature a fairly recent
attempt to justify the public-private divide in light of the modern
case for mandatory disclosure along precisely these lines.111 Not
surprisingly, commentators differ on the question of which type of
third-party effect is the most salient for purposes of making this
determination. While these arguments are intriguing and more or
less plausible, they nevertheless have a distinctly post hoc feel to
them. In other words, they suggest that the current incarnation of
the public-private divide, which Congress has given us, does not
follow inexorably from the modern economic case for mandatory
disclosure.
110. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 104, at 756-57 (“In sum, the misalignment
between the private and social value of information justifies mandatory disclosure. These
arguments seem to prove too much, however, given that they also support mandating
disclosure by closely held corporations. Information regarding corporations that are not
publicly traded is also a public good that will be underproduced by the market. If society gains
from closing the gap between social and private values through mandatory disclosure, why
limit mandatory disclosure to publicly traded corporations?”).
111. See, e.g., id. at 711; Guttentag, supra note 5, at 151; Langevoort & Thompson, supra
note 5, at 336. 
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The first revisionist justification to consider, articulated by Zohar
Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, is that the most important
beneficiaries of disclosure are information traders who attempt to
profit by trading on superior information that they have gathered
through costly research efforts.112 According to this view, these
third-party beneficiaries of disclosure are particularly important
because they are the primary drivers of market efficiency, the
promotion of which Goshen and Parchomovsky view as the main
goal of the federal securities laws.113 Mandatory disclosure places
the search costs that would otherwise be incurred by such informa-
tion traders on the issuers themselves, who can provide it more
cheaply than the traders.114 Additionally, mandatory disclosure
allows information traders to exploit the economies of scale and
scope that are only realized if a critical mass of firms discloses the
optimal amount of information.115 Because these information traders
do not trade on information—and therefore are not shareholders of
the disclosing firm—before they have that information, the benefits
they receive from disclosure are grouped among the “positive
externalities”116 discussed earlier. And consequently, in the absence
of mandatory disclosure, disclosing firms will lack proper incentives
to make the disclosures demanded by these information traders.117
But if this information trader view is the correct one, then it is
questionable how well the current structure of the public-private
divide furthers this goal. Nearly 30 percent of all firms listed on
the NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX (now the NYSE MKT) have no
“meaningful” analyst coverage.118 Analyst coverage of firms on the
112. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 104, at 715-16.
113. Id. at 713, 715, 716 & n.11.
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
117. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law: Filling
Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 609 (2006) (“[D]isclosure obligations are not
exclusively—or even primarily—for the benefit of current shareholders of the company, but
are also for the benefit of outside investors who might consider purchasing the company’s
shares. Thus, the interests of future shareholders may be as important as the interest of
present shareholders in evaluating the disclosure obligations of corporate managers.”).
118. See KEATING INVESTMENTS, ANALYZING THE ANALYSTS: A SURVEY OF THE STATE OF
WALL STREET EQUITY RESEARCH 10 YEARS AFTER THE GLOBAL SETTLEMENT 1 (2006), available
at http://perma.cc/Z473-AZV9. In the report, “meaningful” is interpreted to mean at least one
analyst affiliated with one of the one hundred research firms ranked by two well-known trade
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other national securities exchanges is even more sparse.119 Thus, the
exchange-listed disclosure trigger of section 12(b) of the Exchange
Act is substantially over-inclusive if the goal of the divide is to
identify firms with significant analyst coverage. Nor does the public-
offering disclosure trigger fare much better, because that is basically
the same group as those firms listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and
AMEX.
The shareholder size disclosure trigger of section 12(g) potentially
holds out greater promise, since analyst coverage is likely to be
positively correlated with the amount of trading by institutional
shareholders in the issuer’s securities. Analyst compensation is at
least in part determined by the amount of institutional trading that
analysts drive toward their brokerage houses, and there is some
evidence that institutional traders tend to reward good research by
executing their trades at the brokerage house that produced the
research in question.120 Thus, analysts may decide to cover firms
that have a significant amount of institutional trading, and in fact
empirical studies suggest as much.121 However, the size of a firm’s
shareholder base, although probably correlated with institutional
trading volume, is nevertheless a crude proxy for such trading. And
in fact, when studies of the determinants of analyst coverage
attempt to measure the effects of analyst compensation on coverage
considerations, they inevitably use the more obvious proxy of
trading volume.122 More importantly, these studies suggest that
other factors, like a firm’s accounting fundamentals, may be as
important, if not moreso, than a firm’s institutional trading volume
in determining analyst coverage.123 And yet, the Exchange Act does
not attempt to address these factors. And of course, if this informa-
tion trader view is the right one, then the most obvious disclosure
magazines. Id.
119. See id. 
120. See Boris Groysberg, et al., What Drives Sell-Side Analyst Compensation at High-
status Investment Banks? 49 J. ACCT. RES. 969, 994 (2011); Rachel Hayes, The Impact of
Trading Commission Incentives on Analysts’ Stock Coverage Decisions and Earnings
Forecasts, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 299, 299 (1998).
121. See, e.g., John Shon & Susan M. Young, Determinants of Analysts’ Dropped Coverage
Decisions: The Role of Analyst Incentives, Experience and Accounting Fundamentals, 38 J.
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 861, 863 (2011).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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trigger would be one that attempts to measure directly a firm’s
analyst coverage.124
A contrasting revisionist view of the public-private divide is
provided by Robert Thompson and Donald Langevoort, who believe
that the greatest beneficiary of mandatory disclosure is society as
a whole, and that society benefits the most when disclosure is
imposed upon particularly large companies.125 These scholars
emphasize the analogy between large corporations and governments
and argue that the same social norms that apply to the latter should
apply to the former as well.126 These social norms include “a reason-
able degree of transparency, some level of accountability, and an
openness to external voices,” and are furthered to a certain extent
by mandatory disclosure.127 These scholars tend to emphasize the
importance of a reporting status trigger that tracks the size of firms,
such as section 12(g), which deals with the number of a firm’s
shareholders of record.128
But the number of a firm’s shareholders is probably not particu-
larly closely correlated with its social footprint. After all, there are
widely held companies that are nevertheless rather insignificant
from a social standpoint, because, for example, they are rather small
in terms of revenue or operate in an industry with relatively few
environmental spillovers, or because they are not engaged in
political lobbying. On the other hand, there are many closely held
companies with a large social footprint. For example, as of 2013,
there were 224 private firms in the United States with over $2
billion in annual revenue.129 This list includes firms, like Koch In-
dustries, with a significant environmental impact and substantial
political lobbying.130
124. Note that I have been focused on sell-side analysts here. Goshen and Parchomovsky
also mention buy-side analysts. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 104, at 273. It is
unclear why the disclosure triggers would be any more justifiable when disclosure is viewed
as a subsidy for buy-side analysts than when it is viewed as a subsidy for sell-side analysts.
125. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 376.
126. Id. at 378.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 351-52.
129. America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/largest-private-
companies/list [http://perma.cc/HCP2-LLGY] (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
130. Id.
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A more promising revisionist theory in favor of shareholder
numerosity as a basis for determining the domain of securities
regulation is suggested by the work of Professor Michael
Guttentag.131 In one part of a larger project outlining a policy
approach for repairing perceived shortfalls in the JOBS Act,
Guttentag suggests that the shareholder numerosity trigger may
play a role in identifying those firms that, in the absence of manda-
tory disclosure, may disclose too little due to concerns over the
positive externalities that such disclosure might have with respect
to competitors, suppliers, or customers.132 Recall that because some
types of disclosure could place disclosing firms at a competitive
disadvantage vis-à-vis third parties, the disclosing firm may be
reluctant to make these disclosures.133 And yet in making this
decision, the disclosing firm fails to take into account the offsetting
competitive advantages that such disclosures produce with respect
to these same third parties. This leads to less disclosure than is
optimal from a social welfare perspective.134 Guttentag argues that
firms with fewer shareholders are less likely to take into account
these costs of disclosure because a smaller shareholder base implies
less risk that the disclosure will leak out to competitors or
suppliers.135
Although this is a reasonable defense of using the size of a firm’s
shareholder base as a disclosure trigger, Guttentag’s argument
nevertheless leaves some lingering questions. After all, diversified
investors do not want the firms in which they invest to take into
account these interfirm costs because they know that if the firms do
so, it will lead to a sub-optimal amount of disclosure. Thus, as long
as shareholders are relatively sophisticated and diversified, there
is no reason to believe that there is much of a risk of information
leakage on the part of shareholders. And it stands to reason that
131. Guttentag, supra note 5, at 207-08.
132. See id. at 207 (“The likelihood that a firm’s disclosure policies will be distorted by
positive interfirm externalities also increases as the number of shareholders entitled to
receive the firm’s disclosures increases, because the only way to avoid distortions from
positive interfirm externalities is to assure the firm that disclosed information will be made
available only to the firm’s investors, and not the firm’s competitors. Such an assurance is
easier to provide if the number of shareholders is small.”).
133. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1345-46. 
134. See supra Part II.A.2.
135. See Guttentag, supra note 5, at 207.
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firms themselves, in the absence of mandatory disclosure, would
have incentives to try to deliver disclosure in a way that would
make it difficult to share beyond shareholders. Thus, if we were
trying to formulate a disclosure trigger that would weed out those
firms that are less likely to take into account these costs of disclo-
sure, we might gravitate not toward a shareholder numerosity
trigger, but rather toward some type of sophisticated diversified
investor requirement.
These revisionist theories therefore do not seem to follow inexo-
rably from the modern case for mandatory disclosure. To be sure,
this observation should not be taken as a criticism of the distin-
guished scholars who have advanced these revisionist justifications.
Rather, it should be viewed as a criticism of the public-private
divide itself, which, as we have seen, lacked much if any, theoretical
justification to begin with. And what little justification that was
offered lacks grounding in the economic theory that emerged after
the statute’s enactment and its various amendments. Moreover, as
this Section demonstrates, the modern case for mandatory disclo-
sure suggests a public-private divide that is quite different from the
one that we currently have. These possibilities are explored further
in the next section.
C. Expanding the SEC’s Decision-Making Authority
If these revisionist justifications of the public-private divide are
not entirely compelling, then what does the modern case for manda-
tory disclosure imply about how to draw the boundary between
reporting and non-reporting firms? If one were to remake the public-
private divide from scratch, the economic case for mandatory
disclosure points to a number of possible ways that one might create
that divide that differ dramatically from the way in which the
statute currently operates.136
For example, one might make the case that the most significant
third-party distortion comes from issuers failing to take into account
136. It is worth noting the way in which I am using the “interfirm externalities” justif-
ication for mandatory disclosure here. Notice that I am not suggesting that this justification
explains our current disclosure regime as a descriptive matter. Rather, I am arguing that it
should play a role in describing the ideal disclosure regime as a normative matter.
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the disclosure benefits that redound to competitors. In that case, one
might decide to focus the disclosure regime on those firms that
operate in particularly competitive markets. Accordingly, one might
argue in favor of a disclosure trigger based on an industry’s level of
fragmentation or consolidation, depending on one’s view of a firm’s
utility function for a rival’s information.137 One could capture this
intuition through a disclosure trigger based on well-known industry
concentration ratios, like the Herfindahl index.138
Or one might argue that the most significant distortion comes
from issuers taking into account the disadvantages that disclosure
of supplier-friendly information (like material contracts) might have
on future negotiations, even though such costs are not social costs.139
In that case, one might wish to pursue a disclosure trigger based on
the level of vertical integration exhibited by a firm. The economics
literature suggests a number of different candidates for such a
trigger, including measures like a firm’s value added ratio.140
Alternatively, one might argue, as Professors Goshen and
Parchomovsky do, that the most important third-party beneficiary
of disclosure are analysts, and therefore that disclosure should focus
on those firms with significant analyst followings.141 A disclosure
trigger based on this approach would likely take into account the
most important determinants of analyst coverage, such as the
137. In other words, the question seems to be whether such information is more valuable
in an industry that is highly competitive or in an industry that is highly oligopolistic.
138. The Herfindahl index is a measure of industry competition defined as the sum of the
squares of the market share of the fifty largest firms in an industry, where market share is
expressed as the fraction of the market that a given firm produces. See Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html [http://perma.
cc/JM2U-USBM] (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). An alternative measure of industry competition
is simply the sum of the market shares captured by the four or eight largest firms in an
industry. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 401, 402 n.4 (1983) (“A concentration ratio is the sum of
the market shares of a specified number of firms (conventionally four).”).
139. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 96, at 1345.
140. The value added ratio is the ratio of the firm’s added value to its sales revenue. See,
e.g., OLIVIER FURRER, CORPORATE LEVEL STRATEGY: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 124 (2011).
In this context, added value is defined as the sum of depreciation, amortization, fixed charges,
interest expense, labor and related expenses, pension and retirement expenses, income taxes,
net income and rental expense. This ratio is intended to measure the portion of a firm’s sales
that are generated by activities conducted within the boundaries of the firm, and hence serves
as a measure of vertical integration. See id.
141. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 104, at 716-18.
2014] FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION 441
number of shares outstanding or accounting measures like the
consistency of accounting earnings,142 or possibly even a direct mea-
sure of analyst coverage itself.
Finally, if one shares the view of Professors Thompson and
Langevoort that we maximize the benefits of disclosure when
disclosure focuses on firms with the largest social footprint,143 one
might favor a reporting trigger based on a firm’s number of
employees, its potential environmental impact, or its political
lobbying expenditures.
This rough sketch of some of the possibilities suggested by the
economic case for mandatory disclosure strongly implies that wher-
ever the optimal public-private divide lies, it is likely to be very
different and probably more complicated than the relatively simplis-
tic version that we currently have. It also suggests that the optimal
public-private divide probably makes use of measures drawn from
the accounting and industrial organization literatures, like the
value added ratio and the Herfindahl index.
This observation leads to the first of two conclusions144 that this
Article draws regarding the institutional design of the federal
securities laws: we might benefit by re-allocating decision-making
authority in the federal securities disclosure regime in favor of the
SEC, so that the SEC, and not Congress, determines the contours
of the public-private divide.
There are several obvious objections to this claim that should be
addressed at the outset. First, one might argue that criticism of
Congress’s public-private line-drawing makes little sense because
the modern economic case for securities disclosure could just as
easily by applied to the SEC. That criticism alone, one might argue,
should not be an argument in favor of giving greater decision-
making authority to the SEC. To be sure, there is some truth to this
objection. After all, the SEC, within the sphere of decision-making
authority afforded it by Congress,145 could tailor disclosure rules to
conform more closely to the economic case for disclosure. In other
words, the SEC could exempt from disclosure rules those firms that
142. See, e.g., Shon & Young, supra note 121, at 866-69.
143. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 342.
144. For the second of these two conclusions, see infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
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fall on the “public” side of the public-private divide, but nevertheless
do not exhibit very high third-party effects of information, however
the SEC might define that category. But the SEC has never done
anything like this; thus, one might argue that the SEC is every bit
as guilty as Congress for not taking the economic case for disclosure
regulation seriously.
Even though this is true, this critique misses an important aspect
of the argument that I am making here. I am not arguing that Con-
gress has done such a bad job in drawing the public-private divide
that we should see if the SEC can do better. If that were the case,
then my argument would indeed be susceptible to the criticism that
the SEC does not seem to have done any better than Congress in
creating exemptions for firms in light of the economic case for man-
datory disclosure. But that is not the argument I am making here.
Rather, my argument for giving the SEC greater decision-making
authority in this area is based on the nature of the private-public
decision itself—it requires the type of fine-grained determinations
that are more efficiently made by an expert agency rather than by
Congress.
The second objection is related to the first and is likely to come
from those commentators who tend to believe that the SEC favors
too much regulation.146 If we give the SEC more decision-making
authority, these critics might argue, then the obvious result will
simply be too much regulation applied to too many firms. But this
is not necessarily correct. The argument I am making here is that
securities regulation needs to be rethought so that it more closely
aligns with the dominant (economic) case for disclosure rules. So I
share the intuition of these critics that the status quo is problem-
atic, although perhaps we disagree about the underlying reasons.147
146. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-36 (2003); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The
SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1006; A.C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 978 & n.225, 983 (1999).
147. These other commentators tend to focus on factors like behavioral features that may
cause the SEC to tend toward overregulation. See sources cited supra note 146. While I agree
that this may be the case, I argue that we might be able to constrain these tendencies through
regulatory cost controls of the type that I propose in Part IV. Thus, my argument takes the
following form: Assuming that we can control the error risk inherent in the SEC’s regulatory
task, it would make sense to give the SEC greater discretion over the domain of securities
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In fact, I make this concession in discussing the first objection
above. But my argument is that if we are to take up this project to
rethink securities regulation so that it is more closely aligned with
the economic case for disclosure regulation, then we probably want
to give greater decision-making authority to the SEC since that
modern case requires fine-grained, technocratic determinations
along the lines discussed above that the SEC is simply better
equipped to deal with than Congress.
A third objection might concede that the SEC is better equipped
to make the fine-grained determinations inherent in the private-
public determination, but at the same time view as overly optimistic
the assumption that the SEC would be willing to undertake a
project to reconsider that divide in light of the economic case for
disclosure. Critics who fall into this camp might point to theories of
regulatory empire building, which argue that regulators like the
SEC are more concerned about the size of their bureaucratic domain
than the accuracy of their policy decisions.148 If that is indeed the
case, then it would be futile to afford the SEC greater deference
since it could not be expected to use that deference to craft better
policy. But regardless of whether such a theory of empire building
is warranted with respect to the SEC,149 there are ways of address-
ing this concern other than scrapping a reform project altogether. 
And indeed, better error management controls, discussed in greater
detail in Parts III and IV, might go a long way toward such a goal.
In this Part, I have argued that it may be beneficial to give
greater deference to the SEC by allowing the SEC to determine the
scope of the public and private markets. But if it is indeed true that
we should defer to the SEC regarding that question, it is natural to
ask exactly how the SEC’s authority would be cabined, if at all,
under the statute. The next Part argues that this expansion of SEC
decision-making authority under the Exchange Act should be
regulation than is the case under the current institutional structure.
148. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 922 (1994).
149. For example, John Coates suggested that Congress has been successful in acting as
a check against the SEC's tendency for empire building. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs.
Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L.
531, 559 (2001).
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accompanied by a statutory mechanism to manage the risk of
regulatory error that is inherent in the SEC’s regulatory task.
III. CRITIQUING THE STATUTE: MANAGING RISK OF
REGULATORY ERROR
In the institutional design literature, the problem of how best to
allocate decision-making authority turns largely on the question of
comparative institutional competence, and Part II developed the
argument that, given the proper understanding of the nature of that
inquiry, the SEC is probably more expert than Congress with
respect to the question of the optimal public-private boundary.
Institutional design is also concerned with reducing error costs.
Although allocating decision-making authority to the most expert
institution itself serves to reduce error costs, it is often desirable, if
possible, to put in place additional error reduction measures.
Judicial review is one such example.150 Specific cost-benefit rules are
another.151
In this Part, I argue that while we might reap benefits from
giving the SEC greater decision-making authority—at least with
respect to the question of the optimal public-private divide—we
might also benefit by putting in place more robust error reduction
measures. Does it make sense for Congress to defer more to the
SEC, but also be more skeptical about the agency’s ability to carry
out regulatory tasks without error? That is essentially the argument
that I develop here: the SEC is more expert than Congress and is
better situated to draw the fine lines that separate the public from
the private market. But at the same time, Congress should be
realistic about the complexity of the regulatory task that the SEC
faces and attempt to control for the risk of error inherent in that
task. Judicial review alone cannot be expected to address these
concerns of regulatory error.
150. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 14, at 1452 (characterizing judicial review as a “quality
control” mechanism).
151. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework
of Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2010-16 (2013) (discussing theories of how
cost-benefit analysis might improve decision making).
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This Part considers four sources of regulatory error at the SEC
that, it is argued, merit greater attention under the Exchange Act.
These sources include: (1) psychological biases; (2) public choice
dynamics; (3) sophistication constraints; and (4) epistemic limita-
tions. This Part then argues that while judicial review may correct
for some types of psychological biases and may minimize interest
group influence on the margin, in general, it does not do a particu-
larly good job correcting for the regulatory errors identified here.
A. Four Sources of Error
1. Psychological Biases
The “psychological model” of regulatory error emphasizes the
advantage that expert agencies have over governing laypersons, but
recognizes that this expertise itself has its own sources of error. Two
sources of error are emphasized in the literature.152 The first source
of error is overconfidence. “Experts fail to look beyond the factors
that their training and experience predispose them to consider; they
tend not to test thoroughly their assumptions. Experts are right
more often than laypersons, but not as often as they think.”153 The
second source of error is a certain myopia that arises from the self-
selection that determines the personnel of administrative agencies.
This lack of perspective can lead to mistakes.154
2. Public Choice Dynamics
Public choice theory provides another independent source of
regulatory error at the SEC. Public choice theory applies the
rational actor model of neoclassical economics to the political sphere
in an attempt to model legislative or regulatory outcomes.155 The
theory conceives of the political process as a market for law, where
152. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 579-80 (2002); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive
Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
486, 508 (2002).
153. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 152, at 579.
154. Id.
155. See Levine, supra note 91, at 273.
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the producers are the legislators or regulators, and the consumers
are the public.156 Interest groups promise lawmakers some sort of
future career support (for example, reelection, reappointment, or
future employment) in exchange for laws that benefit them.157
Under this theory, errors arise because regulators maximize their
own self-interest rather than maximizing social welfare. While cre-
ating efficient rules might be consistent at times with maximizing
a regulator’s self-interest, at other times it will be inconsistent with
that goal. In those cases, regulators will be maximizing something
else, what the literature typically refers to as “career support,”158
which will be inconsistent with maximizing the efficiency of
disclosure rules. Many features of securities regulation have been
explained over the years within a public choice framework.159
3. Sophistication Constraints
Another potential source of error at the SEC is the agency’s lack
of economic sophistication; in its analyses this lack of sophistication
leads to a higher risk of error.160 One reason may have to do with the
156. See id.
157. See id. Scholars have characterized what legislators and regulators seek to maximize
in a number of different ways, including “power,” “budget,” and “political slack.” See MUELLER,
supra note 91, at 36-85. One advantage of Levine’s concept of “career support” as the
maximand is its breadth (it takes into account goals as varied as “reelection, reappointment
and post-regulatory employment”) and its intuitive appeal. See Levine, supra note 91, at 273.
158. See Levine, supra note 91, at 273.
159. For example, Professors Jonathan Macey and David Haddock have relied on public
choice theory to explain the SEC’s failure to pursue Congress’s national market system.
Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National
Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 315. These authors have also developed public choice
explanations for insider trading regulation. Jonathan R. Haddock & David D. Macey,
Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading
Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 311 (1987). Additionally, former SEC Chief Economist Gregg
Jarrell has relied on public choice theory to explain why the SEC may have expressed a
preference for a departure from fixed commission rates on the stock exchanges in the 1970s.
Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.L. &
ECON. 273, 273-74 (1984).
160. See Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis,
30 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 325 (2013) (“Despite a history of prominent senior SEC staff
economists dating back to 1935, the SEC has not traditionally held itself out as an agency
with particular expertise in economics—in contrast to other financial regulators like the
Federal Reserve Board, which is led and staffed by economists.”); Wiesel Lost “Everything” to
Madoff, UPSTART BUS. J. (Feb. 26, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/executives/
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fact that the SEC has never been subject to the executive orders
that impose rigorous cost-benefit analysis on executive agencies.161
Since the 1970s, however, the SEC has voluntarily disclosed the
estimated costs and benefits of each new rule,162 and SEC commis-
sioners have repeatedly committed to Congress to conduct economic
analysis with respect to proposed rule making.163 Furthermore, with
the passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
(NSMIA) in 1996, the SEC became required to consider the impact
of its rules on “efficiency, competition and capital formation.”164
However, in practice, neither the SEC’s voluntary cost-benefit
analysis nor its considerations under the NSMIA have proven to be
particularly rigorous. Indeed, the section of SEC releases dealing
with the NSMIA considerations has rarely translated into more
than an invitation to comment on the proposal’s effects on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation, terms that the SEC has never
defined.165 And the SEC’s voluntary cost-benefit analysis has rarely
consisted of more than “[a repetition of] policy arguments made
elsewhere in the release, and supplied no additional information or
analysis.”166
To be sure, there are indications that the SEC is undertaking
efforts to improve the sophistication of its economic analysis. For
example, the agency is hiring more economists,167 and it has recent-
ly issued a series of guidelines to follow in conducting economic
2009/02/26/Elie-Wiesel-and-Bernard-Madoff.html?page=all [http://perma.cc/X75W-EUCV]
(quoting former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt as saying that there is a “lack of real sophis-
tication” at the SEC).
161. The executive order in question—Executive Order No. 12,866—exempted “indepen-
dent regulatory agencies,” like the SEC, from the OIRA review process. Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R.  638 (1993).
162. See Kraus & Raso, supra note 160, at 296.
163. See id. at 297. Commentators have speculated about why, as a tactical matter, the
SEC decided to take this approach. See id.
164. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2012) (requiring that whenever “the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking” it consider “whether the action will promote efficiency, competition,
and capital formation”).
165. Kraus & Raso, supra note 160, at 298.
166. Id. at 297.
167. Julie Goodman, SEC RiskFin to Boost Staff, Economic Analysis, COMPLIANCE INTEL-
LIGENCE (July 26, 2012), http://www.complianceintel.com/Article/3067140/Rules-Pipeline-
Archive/SEC-RiskFin-To-Boost-Staff-Economic-Analysis.html [http://perma.cc/E4JA-XD97]
(reporting that the SEC’s Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation would increase
its staff from sixty to ninety members by the end of summer 2012).
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analysis.168 But these guidelines simply reflect how basic the SEC’s
economic analysis is in practice. For example, the guidelines equate
the benefits of a rule with gains in economic efficiency, and articu-
late the need for the SEC to “determine as best it can the economic
implications of the rule.”169 The guidelines also emphasize the
importance of using third-party empirical research in the SEC’s
analysis, including the need to explain why some studies are deem-
ed to be more persuasive than others.170 Although the guidelines do
not address it, in the absence of relevant studies on a given issue,
the SEC is typically allowed to engage in informed conjecture,171
although the D.C. Circuit has been somewhat contradictory with
respect to this point.172
These guidelines are no doubt an important step toward more
reliable and more rigorous economic analysis, but they are unlikely
to dramatically reduce the error inherent in the regulatory task of
designing efficient disclosure rules. To see this, consider the
regulatory task faced by the SEC in light of the aspirational cost-
benefit analysis reflected in the SEC’s 2012 guidelines. That task
consists of two integral parts: correcting for the distortions that
occur in determining optimal disclosure levels when an issuer takes
into account externalities that should not be taken into account
because they are not social costs—for example, the competitive
disadvantages with respect to suppliers and competitors; and the
externalities that should be taken into account because they are
social benefits—for example, the benefits of disclosure that accrue
to non-investors, like analysts and the public at large.
In assessing a given rule, the SEC would need to analyze both the
costs that the issuer incurs in producing the disclosure in question,
168. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SEC
RULEMAKINGS (2012), available at http://perma.cc/7F8S-ZFSS.
169. Id. at 3, 10.
170. Id. at 14.
171. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
172. See Kraus & Raso, supra note 160, at 316.  Compare Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d
at 142 (noting that the court is “acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base
its every action upon empirical data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency
may be ‘entitled to conduct ... a general analysis based on informed conjecture’ ”), with Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (characterizing the SEC’s
assumption that not all shareholder nominees under the SEC’s proxy access rule would be
opposed as “mere speculation”).
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and the benefits that investors and various non-investor constitu-
ents place on that disclosure. The costs consist not only of out-of-
pocket costs, but also of management’s opportunity costs. The
former is relatively straightforward, whereas the latter is most
definitely not.
In carrying out this task, the SEC might—as its guidelines
suggest—try to rely on academic studies to consider how these
various constituencies value information. However, the academic
literature is unlikely to be helpful in generating these various
valuations. That literature is largely focused on broad questions,
like the extent to which disclosure affects an issuer’s analyst
following or institutional ownership, and how disclosure relates to
a firm’s cost of capital.173 And even though there are some studies
that attempt to quantify the value investors place on disclosure in
general,174 these studies are virtually useless to an SEC that is
trying to figure out how investors value specific proposed disclosure
rules. And even these studies do not attempt to quantify non-
investors’ value of disclosure, even generally.175
To be sure, in adopting a disclosure rule, the SEC typically
follows the notice and comment rulemaking process, which allows
for the public, including the various beneficiaries of mandatory
disclosure, to provide the SEC with input regarding how these
groups value a particular rule.176 But interest groups may have
incentives to act strategically and misreport how much they value
disclosure.177 And even if interest groups are honest in reporting
these valuations, the notice and comment process is hardly a
scientific exercise that results in reliable, quantifiable valuations.
173. See, e.g., Paul M. Healy et al., Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405
(2001). 
174. See Tatiana Popova et al., Mandatory Disclosure and Its Impact on the Company
Value, 6 INT’L BUS. RES. 1, 1 (2013) (analyzing mandatory disclosure rules in the United
Kingdom).
175. See, e.g., id. (avoiding addresing non-investor value of disclosure).
176. See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 484 (1997).
177. This is particularly true under public choice theory’s cost predation model in which
larger firms have an incentive to over-value regulation to the extent that it puts its smaller
rivals at a competitive disadvantage. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the
Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 770 (2013).
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4. Epistemic Limitations
Finally, the SEC is subject to epistemic limitations that can also
lead to regulatory error. These epistemic limitations emerge from
the nature of valuing externalities and the difficulties of conducting
experiments in this context.
First, the externalities. The economic case for mandatory disclo-
sure tells us that the SEC’s job is primarily concerned with valuing
the externalities of information in order to create disclosure rules
that are cost-justified and that would not be produced by the
market. In other contexts involving similar regulatory challenges,
such as intellectual property, it is almost an article of faith that
measuring externalities is an extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible, undertaking, possibly requiring complicated economic
studies.178
These studies themselves are the second source of error. Assum-
ing that the SEC can overcome its sophistication limitations, the
types of studies that the SEC might conduct to measure the benefits
of disclosure rules are themselves replete with error risk. Consider
a simple, stylized example of such a study. Assume that we have
identified a disclosure rule that we think lacks any positive
externalities, although investors are likely to place a positive value
on it.179 The market might not produce such disclosure because
firms take into account the competitive costs that it might produce.
So, in assessing the economic efficiency of such a rule, we need to
correct this distortion by comparing how investors would value the
rule to the operational costs—but not the interfirm costs—of
producing such disclosure. And for simplicity’s sake, we are
assuming that there are no other third parties that would benefit
from such a rule. How might we conduct such a study, and what
might the sources of error be in such a study?
One possibility would be for the SEC to set up a regulatory
experiment adopting a new disclosure rule on a temporary basis for
178. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 801, 816 (2009) (discussing how externalities that are difficult to identify or
capture also tend to be externalities that are difficult to measure, and observing that
“[t]alking about externalities may seem akin to academic hand waving”).
179. It is hard to imagine what such a rule would look like, but let us make the assumption
anyway for ease of explication.
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the purpose of generating data that could be used to craft a better
permanent rule. In that case, the SEC could design an event study
that looks at how the valuation of companies varies during a
window of time surrounding the date when the new disclosure rule
becomes effective.180 Such an approach would be dramatically more
sophisticated than the SEC’s current approach to economic analysis.
But it is unclear that it would be a significant improvement in the
risk of error inherent in the analysis. First, the issuers or investors
might behave differently if they know that the rule is only experi-
mental in nature.181 Second, there are several sources of error built
into event studies themselves.182 The researcher must be able to
identify when the market first learned of the proposed regulation in
order to run such a study, and that sort of determination can be
very imprecise when regulatory processes are long and
complicated.183 Because the results of these studies are extremely
sensitive to the dates that the researcher chooses to focus on for
purposes of the study, this determination is fraught with the
potential for error.184 Additionally, regulation often occurs at the
same time as other potentially market-changing events, including
technological changes and general economic fluctuations, and these
other events can make it difficult to sort out the effects attributable
to the regulatory change.185
180. For a study that takes a similar approach with respect to voluntary disclosure, see
Bryan T. Kelly & Alexander Ljungqvist, The Value of Research (Eur. Fin. Ass’n 2008 Athens
Meeting Paper, 2007), available at http://perma.cc/8WUB-KUGL.
181. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 268-70, 277-78
(2007); Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 148-49 (2014); Rebecca
M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1036-37 (2011).
182. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001) (noting methodological
problems with event studies).
183. J. Harold Mulherin, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Conceptual Issues
in Securities Markets, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 421, 424 (2007).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 424, 432.
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B. Judicial Review’s Inadequacy as a Tool for Managing
Administrative Error Arising from These Four Sources
Judicial review of agency rules is intended to play an error
management role. However, it is extremely unlikely that courts can
reduce all types of regulatory error, including many of those
described above.
Hard look review requires agencies to demonstrate that they have
followed a specific procedure, including that they “ha[ve] responded
to significant points made during the public comment period, ha[ve]
examined all relevant factors, and ha[ve] considered significant
alternatives to the course of action ultimately chosen.”186 In this
sense, courts can serve an accountability function, which some
commentators have suggested may minimize errors resulting from
certain psychological biases, particularly those that emerge from
logical shortcuts and a lack of self-critical thinking.187 However,
these same commentators acknowledge that judicial review may
actually amplify other psychological biases, like the confirmation
bias, where an individual seeks out evidence to confirm her initial
hypothesis.188 In that context, accountability can cause individuals
to spend that much more time and effort seeking out such confirm-
ing evidence.
Modern standards of judicial review of agency action, including
the doctrine of hard look review, were developed in part in an effort
to minimize the effects of agency capture.189 If agencies were
required to demonstrate a sound procedural basis for their deci-
sions, the logic went, then it would be more difficult for agencies to
be captured by interest groups.190 For this reason, one might think
that judicial review is particularly effective with respect to the types
of errors discussed above that may result from public choice
dynamics at agencies.
186. Garland, supra note 67, at 527.
187. See Seidenfeld, supra note 152, at 508-09 (explaining that the psychological literature
suggests that accountability can correct psychological biases and that judicial review satisfies,
to a certain extent, these accountability requirements).
188. See id. at 509.
189. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 34-35 (2009).
190. See id.
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However, judicial review’s effectiveness at addressing these types
of problems is the subject of intense debate.191 The problem is that
there is typically enough flexibility in the administrative record for
an agency to justify the process underlying the regulatory outcome,
even though it may be the result of interest group capture.192 For
this reason, some courts have interpreted hard look review to ad-
ditionally include a substantive component, whereby the court must
review the agency’s explanations and conclusions to ensure that
they are reasonable.193 Although this version of hard look review
191. Compare Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative
Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1054-55 (2000) (arguing that “quality rulemaking is ...
undermined” by the judiciary’s lack of expertise), McGarity, supra note 14, at 1452 (observing
that there are “clear limits to judicial competence in the area of highly scientific and technical
rulemaking”), Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN.
L. REV. 59, 69-70 (1995) (identifying how the judiciary’s lack of expertise can frustrate agency
action), and Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487,
1507 (1983) (“Courts cannot take a hard look at materials they cannot understand nor be
partners to technocrats in a realm in which only technocrats speak the language.”), with Colin
S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 409-21
(1981), Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 811, 818-
20, Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1511, 1570 (1992), Seidenfeld, supra note 152, at 514 (“In short, hard look review
performs a valuable function by encouraging agencies to think through the full implications
of their policies.”), and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 527-29 (“It is also possible to show that
aggressive judicial review has often provided significant benefits both in bringing about
desirable regulatory initiatives and in preventing unreasonable or unlawful regulation.”).
192. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 152, at 588 (“Even under the regime of hard-look
review, an agency determined to adopt a policy favoring a particular political constituency has
abundant opportunities, in how it creates the record and explains its decision, to disguise its
pandering. Only in the marginal case in which the interest-group-favoring policy cannot be
even plausibly justified within the typically capacious boundaries of the statutory delegation
and the typically conflicting contents of the administrative record, will public participation
and judicial review defeat agency capture.”).
193. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (ratifying the procedural and substantive aspects of hard look review); Citizens to Pres.
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (explaining that, in order to survive
arbitrary and capricious review, the agency’s decision must be based on a consideration of the
“relevant factors”—the procedural element—and be free of any “clear error of judgment”—the
substantive element). Note that most commentators agree that the Supreme Court ratified
the procedural and substantive aspects of hard look review in State Farm. See, e.g., M.
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1418 (2004)
(“This so-called ‘hard look review’ developed mainly in the lower courts, especially the D.C.
Circuit, but the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed it in 1983.”); Miles & Sunstein, supra
note 64, at 763 (explaining that the State Farm decision was “widely taken to ratify both
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provides courts with greater ability to vacate or remand rules that
they believe are the result of capture, it does not necessarily provide
the court with greater information about whether that is in fact the
case.194 To be sure, there might be some cases where the interest
group influence is so extreme and the administrative record so
obviously contrary to the dominant interest group’s preferred
outcome, or the outcome itself so obviously unreasonable, that
judicial review may defeat public choice dynamics. But it seems that
this will likely be the exception rather than the rule.
Even though judicial review may at times correct regulatory
errors arising from psychological biases or from public choice
dynamics, the types of errors that courts are least likely to correct
are those stemming from sophistication deficits or epistemological
limitations, both of which seem to be major concerns at the SEC, as
discussed above. The courts195 and commentators196 are acutely
aware that generalist courts lack the expertise of the agencies they
review. If that is true, then it is unreasonable to expect courts to
correct errors that in part stem from concerns over expertise, such
as errors emerging from sophistication deficits and epistemic
limitations.
procedural and substantive components of the hard look doctrine”); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the
Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 423 (“The Court’s
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in State Farm gave it new
substantive content.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP.
CT. REV. 177, 210 (“The State Farm decision expressly endorses the primary elements, both
substantive and procedural, of the hard-look doctrine.”). But see Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 419, 424, 452-57 (2009) (contending
that the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. implicitly
rejected the hard look doctrine and corresponding State Farm dicta, and also that APA
arbitrary and capricious review simply asks whether the agency reasons were “rational”
(citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 556 U.S. 502, 517 (2009))). 
194. Hard look review may, however, provide the court with other valuable information
about the regulatory process. See Matthew Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard
Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006) (suggesting that requiring agencies to
engage in costly defenses of their rules informs courts of the value that the government places
on the policies in question).
195. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004) (noting the
danger of judicial review going too far and the need “to protect agencies from undue judicial
interference” and “to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which
courts lack both expertise and information to resolve”). 
196. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1332
(1999); McGarity, supra note 14, at 1452. 
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For these reasons, an increase in the SEC’s decision-making
authority, as advocated for in Part II, should probably be accompa-
nied by stronger controls for the risk of regulatory error. And such
controls might even be desirable regardless of whether the SEC’s
decision-making authority is expanded.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Part II argued that there are likely benefits to be reaped from
granting the SEC greater authority to determine the precise
boundary that separates the private (unregulated) securities market
from its public (regulated) counterpart. Part III argued that the
SEC’s regulatory task is fraught with the risk of regulatory error
that is not particularly well managed by judicial review, and that we
therefore might benefit from additional mechanisms aimed at
reducing the risk of such error costs. In this Section, I consider how
one might translate these two arguments into policy. Any such
policy would consist of two components, one that attempts to provide
greater decision-making authority to the SEC, and a second
component that attempts to constrain the regulatory costs of SEC
action.
A. Deferring to the SEC on the Public-Private Divide
The first component of any policy proposal that seeks to
operationalize the analysis set forth above would be to give the SEC
the decision-making authority to decide which firms should be
subject to disclosure rules and which firms should not.197 We could
easily accomplish this goal by simply eliminating sections 12(b) and
15(d) of the Exchange Act, thereby creating a rule that says that any
issuer engaged in interstate commerce must file a registration
statement with the SEC that sets forth whatever information the
SEC deems necessary. As discussed in Part II, the SEC currently
can only write disclosure rules for firms that are large—as mea-
sured by size of shareholder base—listed on exchanges, or that have
197. A number of additional sections of the Exchange Act would need to be eliminated or
amended to account for the absence of sections 15(d) and 12(d); however, these changes would
largely be an exercise in cleaning-up and rationalizing, and as such are not discussed here.
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made registered offerings.198 Yet, the original justifications that
were advanced for these particular triggers are problematic in light
of developments in the economic analysis of disclosure that have
occurred since those triggers were created in the 1930s and the
early 1960s. And these disclosure triggers, while arguably consis-
tent with the modern economics case for mandatory disclosure, do
not follow inexorably from that economic theory.
Perhaps even more importantly, however, this policy proposal not
only reflects a need to rethink the public-private divide in light of
modern economic theory, but it also reflects the judgment that the
SEC, and not Congress, is probably better situated to take on this
rethinking project. Under modern economic theory, the mandatory
disclosure regime should focus disclosure efforts on those firms for
which the market failure arising from the third-party effects of
information is thought to be particularly acute. A cursory attempt
to imagine how we might redraw the public-private divide in light
of that inquiry suggests that the optimal rules are likely much more
complicated than the current divide, that the policy choices may
turn on very fine-grained judgments having to do with various
aspects of accounting and industrial organization, and that the SEC,
as the expert agency, is more competent from an institutional
perspective to make these decisions.199
One potential objection is that this approach would create a
certain disconnect between the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
After all, this approach would eliminate section 15(d) of the
Exchange Act, which creates a disclosure obligation for any firm
that has made a registered offering under the Securities Act.200
Thus, under the current regime, a public offering itself is a trigger
for continuous disclosure under the Exchange Act.201 By eliminating
section 15(d), this approach would open up the possibility that a
firm could make a public offering under the Securities Act, but then
make no further disclosures under the Exchange Act if the SEC has
refused to adopt any disclosure rules that would apply to that
particular firm. This is certainly a possibility, and in this sense, the
198. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part II.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2012).
201. See id.
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approach could create a disconnect between the two statutes.
However, this disconnect is less disconcerting if one adopts the view
that the Securities Act is attempting to address a very different
problem from that addressed in the Exchange Act. The Securities
Act is primarily concerned with the selling pressures that accom-
pany an initial distribution of securities, and it uses disclosure to
accomplish this goal.202 The Exchange Act, by contrast, is concerned
with trading transactions in the secondary market, which do not
involve the same selling pressures.203 So, the fact that there is a
disconnect between the two statutes is not particularly surprising.204
Additionally, even under the scenario where no Exchange Act rules
apply to a firm that has already made a public offering, that firm
will likely continue to make some voluntary disclosure, even if it is
less than the mandatory disclosure that it was obligated to make
under the Securities Act.
B. Controlling for Regulatory Error at the SEC
The second component of a policy proposal modeled after the
analysis set forth above would need to attempt to minimize the risk
of regulatory error implicit in the SEC’s task of crafting efficient
disclosure rules. To this end, consider a policy205 that would charge
a special advisory committee to Congress with the task of analyz-
ing—on a periodic basis—the disclosure costs the current regulatory
regime imposes upon firms. The advisory committee would then
recommend, in light of those costs, whether the SEC should take
some action or forbearance.206
202. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 53, at 1578-79.
203. See id. at 1581, 1585-86.
204. See id. at 1585-86 (“What makes a public offering special in terms of investor
protection is the business-driven need to induce increased demand so as to absorb a large
number of shares suddenly coming to market—work typically done by financial
intermediaries (underwriters and dealers). It is the combination of that need and the issuer’s
self-interest that justifies the registration requirement.”)
205. I am grateful to Professor Langevoort for suggesting how one might translate the
thought experiment below into this more practical solution. 
206. This is a variation of cost-benefit analysis, to be sure. The problem with mandating
that an agency like the SEC engage in cost-benefit analysis in the hope of reducing regulatory
error is that the same pathologies that we believe might lead to regulatory error in the first
place are also likely to affect the agency’s cost-benefit analysis. In an effort to remedy this, one
might have another entity conduct the cost-benefit analysis or at least establish the
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In order to understand the desirability of this sort of proposal, let
us first consider how we might achieve this regulatory error
management goal under “nearly ideal” circumstances, which will
then allow us to consider how the proposal summarized above
approximates this near ideal in the real world. For purposes of this
thought experiment, consider a world in which we are relatively
confident that we are able to identify—at least in terms of a
range—the regulatory costs that a theoretically optimal disclosure
regime would impose on firms. In other words, we are relatively
confident in saying that we think the theoretically optimal disclo-
sure regime would impose disclosure costs no greater than x percent
and no less than y percent of a given firm’s total costs, revenues,
income, or some other income statement metric. Let us also assume
that we cannot quantify the benefits of that theoretically optimal
regime—that is why this is merely the “near ideal” case. Let us
further assume that we are fairly confident that we can quantify the
regulatory costs that we are imposing on firms subject to the
current disclosure regime. Under these circumstances, what type of
regulatory error cost control mechanism might we adopt?
Under such circumstances, we might have Congress place
statutory limits—both in terms of an upper- and lower-bound—on
the costs that the SEC could impose on regulated firms through
disclosure rules, effectively creating an allowable range of disclosure
costs. It would be important to establish both an upper- and lower-
bound because although the analysis in Part II suggests several
reasons to believe that the SEC will err in designing disclosure
rules, those reasons suggest that the agency will not consistently err
in one particular direction.207 Congress might fine-tune this ap-
proach by dividing issuers into groups based on size, perhaps
determined by operating income or the like, and then establishing
parameters that the agency should rely on in conducting such an analysis. 
207. To be sure, the type of public choice model that has typically been applied to the
SEC—the cost predation model—does suggest a tendency on the part of the SEC to over-
regulate. If one accepts that model as the best predictor of SEC behavior at all times, then one
might conclude that SEC error tends in the direction of over-regulation. However, if the public
choice model is not always the primary driver of error at the SEC—and as an aside, that
assumption seems reasonable—the three other sources of error identified in Part III all allow
for the possibility of error in either direction.
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an allowable disclosure cost range for each of these company size
groups.208
The expectation would be that the SEC or an advisory committee
would periodically measure the actual disclosure costs of companies,
and calculate the average disclosure cost for a given company size
group, all, of course, in light of parameters209 established by
Congress.210 To be sure, the costs of gathering the company-specific
data needed to make these calculations, and the subsequent costs
of the calculations themselves, would be significant. But the SEC or
advisory committee could probably reduce these costs by only
considering a sample of firms in each company size group.
Armed with these calculations, the SEC or advisory committee
could then compare these actual disclosure costs to the allowable
cost range that Congress has established for the various company
size groups. The SEC could then use the results of this exercise to
help determine whether further action is necessary. As long as the
disclosure costs for a given company size group fall within the
applicable statutory cost range, the SEC would likely have no
further obligations. If, on the contrary, the disclosure costs were to
fall outside of the applicable range, either because the SEC’s current
rules are excessively costly or not costly enough—in other words,
because there is too much or too little regulation as measured by
costs—the SEC would have to make regulatory adjustments to bring
these costs back into line with the statutory ranges. To ensure
compliance, Congress could prohibit the SEC from taking any fur-
ther regulatory action until it had taken reasonable steps to address
the cost under- or over-run. And even if current disclosure costs fall
within the allowable cost ranges, perhaps the SEC would be
required to indicate in its adopting release for a given regulatory
208. This aspect of the thought experiment resembles other analyses calling for some sort
of tiered disclosure. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 531 (2012); Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 53.
209. These parameters would, for example, include how to measure firm-specific disclosure
costs. 
210. It is important to have a third party set the parameters of the cost-benefit analysis if
the purpose of the cost-benefit analysis is to reduce the regulatory error inherent in the
agency’s regulatory task. If the agency is given carte blanche with respect to the cost-benefit
analysis, then it is likely that the same pathologies that lead to the risk of regulatory error
in the first place will affect the agency’s cost-benefit analysis. 
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action why it believed that the adopted action will not push
disclosure costs outside of the allowable cost ranges.
Thus, under this approach, if the SEC wished to pursue a de-
regulatory or regulatory agenda, it would be prohibited from taking
that action without justifying in the action’s adopting release why
it believed that such action would not push the disclosure regime
outside the bounds of the relevant allowable cost ranges. Similarly,
if it were to conclude that the disclosure costs of the current regime
fall outside the bounds of the relevant allowable cost ranges, the
SEC would be prohibited from pursuing any further deregulatory or
regulatory policies without first bringing the current regime in line
with respect to the allowable cost ranges. The SEC would therefore
face a strong incentive to bring its rules into line with what
Congress would have determined to be socially optimal disclosure
costs, since refusal would thwart the SEC’s agenda, regardless of
whether that agenda is of the regulatory or de-regulatory variety.
This approach would be fairly effective at managing the risk of
regulatory error at the SEC, provided that the assumptions
underlying our thought experiment hold true. Before considering
those assumptions, however, let us address one obvious question:
Does this approach really address the risk of regulatory error? After
all, just because we are controlling the costs of disclosure does not
mean that we are necessarily addressing regulatory error. The SEC
could still adopt inefficient rules whose costs exceed benefits, even
though the costs might be limited.
In an ideal world, we would control regulatory error by comparing
the benefits and costs of a rule. The problem is that the benefits of
disclosure are extraordinarily difficult to value for the reasons
stated in Part II, and the SEC does not even have a consistent
practice of attempting to quantify these benefits. For example, an
approach based on verifying that there is, a margin of error between
costs and benefits seems utterly unrealistic at this point in the
evolution of United States securities regulation and the SEC. And
for that reason, I have assumed as much for purposes of the “nearly
ideal” world of my thought experiment. Under my thought experi-
ment, as long as we think that we have created reasonable cost
ranges, we are at the very least making inefficient rules less likely
by controlling costs, and reducing the costs of such rules in the event
2014] FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION 461
that they do occur. Thus, even in the nearly ideal world of our
thought experiment, this approach merely reduces the likelihood of
regulatory error—and the effects of such error—but it certainly does
not eliminate it altogether.
Thus, this cost-reduction approach might actually work to rein in
the risk of regulatory error at the SEC—regardless of the direction
toward which we think that error is biased—so long as the assump-
tions that underlie the thought experiment hold true. Of course,
those assumptions are probably not realistic. In actuality, we are
probably not that confident about being able to establish, on an ex
ante basis, the range of disclosure costs that an optimal disclosure
regime would impose on regulated firms. And we are also probably
not particularly confident that we can calculate the level of disclo-
sure costs that the current regime imposes on regulated firms.
However, we might be able to come close. Perhaps not close
enough to justify a regime, like the one outlined above, in which
everything is settled ex ante through bright-line statutory rules
established by Congress that are enforced through a mechanism
that incentivizes the SEC to take some action or forbearance in the
case of a cost under- or over-run. But perhaps we could accomplish
something similar through an advisory committee that reports
directly to Congress, and that is specifically charged with analyzing
disclosure costs, which brings us back to the policy proposal
summarized above.
While SEC advisory committees exist,211 there are none currently
charged with the task of managing the costs of regulatory error.
Such a committee could basically perform the analysis outlined
above, identifying allowable cost ranges and calculating actual dis-
closure costs based on sampling. But, unlike the bright-line, ex ante
211. For example, there is currently an advisory committee jointly commissioned by the
SEC and CFTC whose task is to “develop recommendations on emerging and ongoing issues
relating to both agencies.” See CFTC-SEC Joint Advisory Committee, U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCCommittees/CFTC-SECJoint
AdvisoryCommittee/index.htm [http://perma.cc/V5J5-ND4H] (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
Other recent advisory committees include the Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging
Companies and the SEC Investor Advisory Committee. See Advisory Committee on Small and
Emerging Companies, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/
acsec.shtml [http://perma.cc/W6CQ-ZF39] (last visited Sept. 28, 2014); Investor Advisory
Committee, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-
committee-2012.shtml [http://perma.cc/N4M7-MY8T] (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
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approach taken in our thought experiment, under this second best
approach the advisory committee could also make clear its level of
confidence with respect to these various estimates. And Congress
would then have discretion to act by requiring some SEC action or
forbearance in accordance with the advisory committee’s findings.
The downside of this approach would be that it would not necessar-
ily have the effect on regulatory action that the thought experiment
would have, because this approach would require Congress to act
before the SEC has any obligation to act or forbear. And Congress
might refrain from acting even when the advisory committee has a
high level of confidence that Congress should intervene at the SEC
to help manage the risk of regulatory error. In other words, this
proposal would not have the self-enforcing aspect of our thought
experiment. The virtue of this approach is that it would address the
data concerns that plague the ex ante bright-line approach taken in
the thought experiment, and it would hold out the likeli-
hood—perhaps not as certain as in our thought experiment, but a
likelihood nonetheless—that regulatory error costs would indeed be
limited.
C. What About Decision Costs?
This Article has argued that we might draw on institutional
design principles to create a structure for securities regulation that
yields smarter, less error-prone laws. In particular, this Article has
argued that we might reduce error costs in the securities regulation
context by granting the SEC greater decision-making authority
while at the same time implementing a system for controlling the
regulatory costs that the SEC is able to impose on the firms that are
subject to its regulations. One question left unaddressed regards the
decision costs associated with this policy proposal. Analyses of
institutional design typically focus on not only error costs, but on
decision costs as well. These are the costs involved in making a
decision, including the costs of data collection, experimentation,
analysis, and the like.212 Typically, there is a tradeoff between error
costs and decision costs.213 The expert might make half as many
212. See Kelly, supra note 20, at 865. 
213. See id. 
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errors as the layman but spend twice as much in resources to reach
his decision.
Thus, the analysis is incomplete if it focuses solely on error costs
associated with a proposed institutional structure. It is also
necessary to take into account the necessary decision costs. That
inquiry is always very speculative. However, I think it is a little less
speculative in this case if we can agree on the relevant baseline
against which to measure the decision costs associated with this
proposal.
Specifically, I have argued that the public-private divide should
be determined by reference to those firms or industries where the
third-party effects of disclosure are particularly high. The economic
case for disclosure regulation implies that these environments
exhibit high third-party effects, and therefore mandatory disclosure
is likely to be superior to market-provided disclosure. The question
is not how the decision costs of the status quo compare to the
decision costs of this proposal, because the status quo does not ask
how the public-private divide should be drawn in light of the
economic case for mandatory disclosure rules. Rather, once we have
decided that the public-private divide must be drawn in light of the
economic case for mandatory disclosure, the question becomes
whether the decision costs are less if we have the SEC or Congress
engage in that line-drawing exercise. It is not at all clear that the
decision costs would be greater if we had the SEC undertake that
task, especially when one takes into account the fact that there are
typically a greater number of interest groups involved at the
congressional, rather than the agency, level.214 Thus, at worst, it
seems that the decision costs will be the same for the SEC. But if
this is the case—that the decision costs of drawing the public-
private divide are relatively the same regardless of whether the
SEC or Congress is doing the line-drawing—then I think this
weighs in favor of concluding that granting the SEC greater
authority on this decision would be efficient. As I have argued
above, the error costs of having the SEC decide this issue are likely
to be much less.
214. See Gubler, supra note 177, at 790-92.
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The efficiency of the second aspect of my proposal—the regulatory
cost control mechanism—is substantially more speculative. The
decision costs associated with this regulatory cost control mecha-
nism are undoubtedly very high compared to the appropriate
baseline, which is simply the status quo without a cost-control
mechanism. The question there is whether the reduction in error
costs outweighs the increase in decision costs associated with
creating the regulatory cost control mechanism in the first place.
And, unfortunately, that question is impossible to resolve without
some sort of empirical data or, perhaps, policy experimentation.215
I will leave that for another day. What I hope to have accomplished
in this Article is to make the case for greater error cost controls and
propose one possible solution.
CONCLUSION
Questions about the optimal allocation of decision-making
authority among Congress and agencies, including how to minimize
the risk of decision error in delegated decision-making, are peren-
nial questions in the institutional design literature. In the securities
regulation context, these questions were settled long ago, at a time
when the policy justifications for a mandatory corporate disclosure
regime were strikingly different from those that tend to dominate
the scholarly debate today. And yet, these policy justifications are
integral to our institutional design choices. For these reasons, this
Article has argued that it is time to reassess these questions in the
context of securities regulation. That reassessment implies that we
might benefit by giving the SEC greater decision-making authority
over securities regulation’s domain—in other words, which firms are
subject to the mandatory disclosure regime in the first place. This
approach would allow the SEC to make the type of fine-tuned
regulatory determinations that are called for by the dominant
justification of mandatory disclosure today, which holds that
mandatory rules are necessary to correct for market failures arising
from the third-party effects of information. At the same time,
however, it might be desirable to put in place greater controls for
215. See Gubler, supra note 181, at 129.
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the risk of decision error that is inherent in the SEC’s complicated
regulatory task. The upshot is a regime based on greater trust, but
also greater verification. The policy proposal outlined in this Article
is one attempt at putting these policy goals to work. There is no
doubt that such a policy proposal is ambitious, but the possibility of
achieving a smarter and less error-prone regulatory structure may
be worth the heavy lifting.
